[EM] Re: Diana's Proposed method of cycle resolution:

[Donald Davison]

Greetings Diana and list members,

Diana, you wrote:          Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2003 10:54:45 +0100
"I know there are already far too many methods out there..."

Donald here:  `When you're right, you're right', but go ahead and spoil our
day anyway, give us a few more cycle resolutions.

Diana: "...but here's another (two) that I'm vaguely partial to.  I'm sure
there are good reasons why neither of them is any good, but since I can't
see them (and neither can my work colleagues) I thought I'd toss them out
to this list for the eagle-eyed to pick over."

Donald: Odds are that you are correct, that is, there are good reasons why
neither of them is any good, but you are not alone, almost all the cycle
resolutions are no good.  Most people who concoct cycle resolutions do not
understand the context of a circular tie.  As a result, their cycle
resolutions depend on defective data, which inturn makes the solution
defective, or in other words, garbage in garbage out.  I'm talking about
the lower choices.  A circular tie proves that the lower choices are
flawed.  To use the lower choices when they are flawed is the wrong thing
to do.

First, let me say that a circular tie is not the fault of Condorcet.  When
a circular tie has occurred, it merely means that Condorcet has reveled
that the voters have voted in a circular pattern.  At this point everyone
should realize that something is wrong and should not use any cycle
resolution that depends on the lower choices because the lower choices are
at least suspect.

A circular tie should be regarded as a warning bell to the fact that the
lower choices in this election are flawed and should not be trusted.  Most
likely this flaw was caused by the voters not being informed well enough to
make good lower choices.

Years ago, on this list, I suggested that when Condorcet shows a circular
tie that the best thing to do was to eliminate one candidate.  Most likely
this will break the cycle.  Then you can resume using Condorcet if you
must.

Anyway, in my school of thinking, almost all choices are suspect and the
policy should be to use as few as possible.  This is one of the reasons I
favor Irving because Irving will use less lower choices than any other
multi choice method.  Consider the following election:  45 Axx    45 Bxx
10 Cxx

Condorcet will use all the lower choices.  Irving will only use ten percent
of the lower choices.  Using less is best.  A multi choice election that
has a majority winner in the first choices is ideal because no lower
choices will be used.  Think about that, if that is the ideal, then we
should stay as close as possible to the ideal as we can when picking an
election method.


Donald,