[EM] (CIRCLE) Cardinal [I] Rating Condorcet Loser Elimination

[Donald Davison]

Subject: [EM] Cardinal Rating Condorcet Loser Elimination
Date: Thu, 28 Aug 2003 19:34:41 EDT

David Gamble writes: "Hello everybody

My favourite type of example to post on this list is the following:

    45 A>B>C     6 B>A>C     5 B>C>A     44 C>B>A

I argue that B shouldn't win because he/she is very likely to be a low
utility compromise- the least worst."

Donald here:  You are correct, B shouldn't win.  If the voters wanted her
to win they would have done more than merely given her their second choice,
a majority would have voted for her.

David: "Many people on this list disagree with me and feel that B should
win. They argue that he/she is a genuine compromise and the most generally
preferred
candidate."

Donald:  True, many people on this list feel that B should win, but those
people are a very small minority in the real world, in which most voters
would not agree that a third party candidate should win.  After all, any
election method should benefit the voters, not some turkey candidate
supported by the `Gang of Four' - MikeO, Tarr, Gorr, and that other guy,
what's his name.

The `Gang of Four' will not accept the fact that ranking means: `The first
choice is greater than the second choice and that the second choice is
greater than the third choice.

David: "Actually neither myself nor those who disagree with me can be
certain as to whether B is really a low utility turkey ( the least worst)
or a popular compromise (the most best). This is because ranked ballots
just tell us that the first choice is preferred to the second choice not
how much the first choice is preferred to the second choice."

Donald:  Only the voters (all of them) can answer those questions and only
the voters should be allowed to answer those questions.

David: "I've been trying to think of a method that overcomes this problem
and I've come up with something that I've snappily called " cardinal rating
Condorcet loser elimination".

Donald:  How often will your method, `Cardinal [Insidejob] Rating Condorcet
Loser Elimination' (CIRCLE), elect the ESBS-winner, the standard for all
single-seat methods?


Exhaustive Secret Ballots Standard (ESBS): by Donald Davison

  * One secret vote per person.
  * If one candidate has a majority on the first ballot, that candidate
wins - election is over.
  * If no candidate has a majority, then there will be a next ballot, etc,
until there is a candidate with a majority.
  * No candidates are eliminated, but a candidate is allowed to withdraw
after any ballot.
  * No voter is forced to change his vote, but any voter is allowed to
change his vote on the next ballot.
  * The final winner will be the result of the actions taken by the
candidates and the voters.
  * Whoever is the winner of the ESBS election is the correct winner.
  * While we would not use Exhaustive Ballot for an election, any method
that is used must be compared to ESBS, that is, does the method elect the
ESBS-winner?


Condorcet and Approval will not always elect the ESBS-winner.
Irving will elect the ESBS-winner more often than Condorcet or Approval.


Donald Davison,