[EM] Re: IRV - Approval, Condorcet-Approval hybrids

[Chris Benham]

Kevin Venzke wrote (Mon. Sep.1,03):
This leads me to the other topic. The most "common" Condorcet-Approval 
hybrid,
it seems to me, is to elect the Approval winner among the Smith set members.
I've read that there is concern about strategy incentives under those rules.
I wonder if that concern could be lessened if the rule were instead:

While there is no CW,
Eliminate the Approval loser.

This will always elect a Smith set member, because it's not possible to
eliminate all Smith set members without creating a CW.

This seems better, to me, than Smith//Approval, because it still uses the
pairwise contests to make a decision. The Approval winner won't necessarily
win.

Any thoughts...?

<http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2003-July/010198.html>CB: 
Yes. It is very similar to an idea I posted here on Wed. July 16, 03:
http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2003-July/010198.html

"Voters rank the candidates, equal preferences ok. Also voters insert an 
Approval cutoff, default  is between  1 and 2. (Yes/No option for each 
candidate is also ok, with default being Yes to all the number ones and 
No to the rest.)
If any candidates are approved by a majority, eliminate the rest. Of 
 the remaining, elect the CW if there is one. If not,eliminate all non-
members of the Smith set and also the Smith set member with the fewest
approvals.Of the remaining, elect the CW is there is one.If not then
eliminate the remaining candidate with the fewest approvals, and so on." 

The only real difference is that you have omitted the first step.Do either
or both of these methods pass Participation?

Chris Benham







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