[EM] Re: IRV - Approval, Condorcet-Approval hybrids

[Kevin Venzke]

Chris,

 --- Chris Benham <chrisbenham at bigpond.com> a écrit : 
>> While there is no CW,
>> Eliminate the Approval loser.
 
> "Voters rank the candidates, equal preferences ok. Also voters insert an 
> Approval cutoff, default  is between  1 and 2. (Yes/No option for each 
> candidate is also ok, with default being Yes to all the number ones and 
> No to the rest.)
> If any candidates are approved by a majority, eliminate the rest. Of 
>  the remaining, elect the CW if there is one. If not,eliminate all non-
> members of the Smith set and also the Smith set member with the fewest
> approvals.Of the remaining, elect the CW is there is one.If not then
> eliminate the remaining candidate with the fewest approvals, and so on." 
> 
> The only real difference is that you have omitted the first step.

Hmm, these methods didn't initially seem similar to me.  Your method checks
for majority approval, and also explicitly eliminates non-Smith members.
That's probably not really necessary, but still equivalent.

> Do either
> or both of these methods pass Participation?

I don't think so.  What if your vote causes a cycle which is broken to your
detriment?  I don't really know how to construct such a scenario, but it seems
possible, at least as possible as with RP.


Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr


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