[EM] Re: Woodall's DAC, Plurality

Stephane Rouillon stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca
Wed Oct 1 10:13:02 PDT 2003


Kevin Venzke a écrit :

> Markus gives this example in his paper:
> 11 AB
> 7 B
> 12 C
>
> According to Plurality, A must not be elected.  Monotonicity may not be sufficient
> here, because of the role B may play in deciding the winner.

Another example where, even with no Condorcet winner, no truncating or
over-ranking stategies can benefit any of the blocks of voters when using
ranked pair with winning-votes on an extended graph...

11: A > B > Z > C
7:  B > Z > A ? C
12: C > Z > A ? B

A > B : 11 >  7
C > A : 12 > 11
Z > A : 19 > 11
B > C : 18 > 12
B > Z : 18 > 12
Z > C : 18 > 12

Result: B > Z > C > A (only A > B does not lock)
11 or less : A (truncated) or 12 or less: C > A (over-ranked) are of no
benefit compared to sincere preferences.

Steph




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