[EM] Re: Approval Strategy A- Question for Rob LeGrand

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Mon Nov 24 17:05:26 PST 2003


 --- Dgamble997 at aol.com a écrit : 
> Kevin Venzke wrote:
> >Are you looking to show that Plurality, for example, is more likely to be
> >proportional
> >than Condorcet? Random Ballot is easily more proportional than that. Better
> >yet,
> >put a PR method in your model.
> The one thing the model has demonstrated clearly than anything else is the 
> truth of what myself and a number of other people on the list have been saying 
> for a long time - an assembly made up of single seats can be proportional only 
> by chance. 

I don't recall anyone disputing this, though.

I would guess that any single-winner method which produces proportional results
on the whole, is actually producing garbage results, if you focus on any particular 
district.  Consider Random Ballot to see what I'm getting at.

> Which single seat method you use can have a considerable effect on the 
> make-up of the assembly though. Plurality is neutral as regards where parties are 
> positioned on a left-right spectrum,

I am astonished that you would call Plurality "neutral" in this respect.

> Borda (which tends to be 
> unpredictable and throw up a minority of odd results) is most favourable to  
> centrists.

But I'm sure you'd agree that the method is too manipulable for this to hold
true in the real world (crowding incentive, burial incentive...).

Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr

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