[EM] untraceable receipts
dglaude at gmx.net
Fri Nov 14 13:56:02 PST 2003
Ernest Prabhakar wrote:
> There's also something to be said for not over-optimizing for the corner
> cases. At least in the vast majority of precincts in the U.S., active
> coercion is quite rare. We should design to avoid the most common
> problems, as long as there was some way to address the edge cases with
> more effort.
Belgium is not a country where we think the government or a specific
party will try to modify the election result to get more power or stay
for ever in power. At least not here and now.
However if electronic voting become common place, in many years, no-one
will care to verify or distrust the system. And at that time, maybe the
less democratic party of all will be in power and try to stay there by
Also there is another risk. If Cuba start doing electronic election
taking Belgium or the US as an example and mimic it. Then we (democratic
country) will have no way to say that the system Cuba use is not democratic.
Actually Belgium frequently send observer all arround the world (in
country where the democracy is weak) in order to verify if everything
goes well. But WHO ARE WE to judge the level of democratic election in
other country where in our own country it is not possible to recount and
only few the happy few expert or worker from the vendor of the e-voting
system could control the election result.
> Of course, in other countries I imagine it would be quite different.
> But I think the more important question is whether we can reach
> consensus about -what- information should be available to -whom-.
My vote should only be known by me (that is the principle of a secret).
I don't even trust the computer in front of me. ;-) (many ATM machine
have a "web"-cam for security reason. How long until voting machine have
Then my vote exactly as I made it should be available (mixed and shaked
with other) to the counting team... counted with whitness from each
party. Then after the count, keeped securely for potential recount.
I think that before any electronic system get introduced, you need to
carefull set the goal and define what democratic election are.
My definition is:
1) The vote should be secret.
2) The election result should be under citizen control (not expert
control) [Where expert are the computer scientist for the state or from
the vendor or ...]
If a system exclude 99.9% of the population that must trust the other
0.1% able or capable to understand the system, then we have a problem.
I had the plan to present a list of computer scientist durring the
election. Then if our list get absolute majority... who will trust the
result of the election.
> If we can agree on that social question, the technical problems
should > be simple to resolve.
Trust me it is NOT SIMPLE at all.
Securing a system from the user might be easy.
Securing a system from the creator/operator of it (and hacker) is way
much more difficult.
Making such a system transparent as election should be without
compromising the secrecy of the vote make it even more difficult.
More information about the Election-Methods