[EM] Securing electronic elections

Anthony Duff anthony_duff at yahoo.com.au
Tue Nov 11 16:21:02 PST 2003

 --- matt at tidalwave.net wrote: 
> A non-encrypted voting receipt that identifies the votes cast by a voter creates
> potential for mischief, particularly if it is retained by the individual voter. 
> Thugs could demand to see the receipt and intimidate voters, imposing physical,
> economic or social harm on those who voted "incorrectly".  Also, counterfeit receipts
> could be utilized to falsely challange election outcomes.

My favourite solution is this:

When the voter has completed voting using a computer, a hard copy is produced.  The
voter checks the correctness of the hard copy and puts it into a traditional ballot box
on the way out of the polling station.

Results are calculated by computer.  Challenges to the electronic recording and
counting of votes are resolved by counting the paper hard copies.

The people and organisations that have access to the computers, the software and data
are kept entirely distinct from those who have control and access to the ballots.

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