[EM] The "Turkey" problem

[Dave Ketchum]

On Thu, 29 May 2003 19:33:28 +0200 (CEST) Kevin Venzke wrote:

> Dave,
> 
> We seem to be having communication problems.  I wonder if you would have
> an easier time accepting these claims:
> 
> 1. There are no guarantees that the CW would not have received the
> FEWEST votes, had the same election used Approval as the method.


I pass on this one, partly because Approval strategy is different.

That the CW would have received the fewest Approval votes is unlikely, for 
many voters ranked the CW as better than other candidates, and therefore 
are likely to also have Approved in that election method.


> 2. The "Approval loser" can arguably be called the "worst" candidate.


I pass, again partly on strategy.

> 
> I am quite happy to weaken my claim to the above.


Perhaps this all started with worth.  Seems like you could have stayed out 
of trouble if you had made it clear that the values you assigned were your 
choices, and the calculations based on them were such, rather than 
inherent in the election,

> 
> 
>  --- Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com> a écrit : 
> 
>>I qualify that a bit.  Given candidates I personally see as close to tied, 
>>and a bunch of issues involved, I could assign a personal worth to each 
>>candidate for how well they did on each of these issues - thus developing 
>>a personal valuation to guide my own voting.
>>
> 
> Ok.  Suppose you and I both say, BEFORE the election, "I don't really like
> candidate A."  Would you deny that my statement and your statement can be
> compared in meaning?
> 

They have the same basic meaning, though not precisely identical.

> 
>>>Well, numeric values aren't even necessary if all one wants to show
>>>is that the CW might displease EVERYONE (in ABSOLUTE terms, keep in mind;
>>>I'm fully aware that no one ranks B last).  In the ABCD scenario where
>>>everyone ranks D second, I could simply say, "Everyone thinks D is a
>>>twit, and he is the CW."  No interpretation is involved here.  I'm
>>>telling you that's how it is.
>>>
>>>If you agree that this situation is possible, we can be done with this.
>>>Note the wording is "D is a twit," not "D is the biggest twit" or "D
>>>is everyone's least favorite."
>>>
>>And I read the votes as saying D PLEASES everyone.
>>
> 
> That's a fair interpretation, but since I'm now telling you that D
> is universally believed to be a twit, surely there is a place for the
> word "displeasure" here.
> 

I addressed this at the beginning of this post.  Anyway, the votes tell me 
the voters were pleased to be able to vote for him - they did not make him 
last.


> 
>>True that A backers 
>>would prefer their candidate but, considering that that is an impossible 
>>dream, they should be thankful that D protects them from having B or C 
>>win (and B and C backers should have similar thoughts).
>>
> 
> They probably are "relatively pleased," but that is a different beast
> from what I'm talking about.  They can be relatively pleased, and displeased
> (in absolute terms) at the same time.
> 

Splitting hairs?  To what benefit?

> 
>>And, again, it could be that all the voters agree that D is a good and 
>>qualified candidate - A, B, and C get in the act because each of them 
>>convinces some of the voters that they are even better.
>>
> 
> I agree that this was possible BEFORE I added that everyone believes
> D is a twit.
> 
> 
>>Could be that some or all rate D lower - but none assign D the bottom of 
>>the barrel - each rates 2/3 of the other candidates as worse.
>>
> 
> No "could be" about it, that's the way it was.  (Everyone truncated after
> D.)
> 
> 
>>>It is one possible definition of "worst."  "Condorcet Loser" is another
>>>possible definition.  If the election method is Condorcet, you cannot do
>>>any better than the latter definition.  I'm not saying you can.
>>>
>>>
>>Do not remember seeing "Condorcet loser" elsewhere, but it could have the 
>>almost useless meaning of "all candidates except Condorcet winner".
>>
> 
> It means a candidate who is beaten by everyone else.  I take that to be
> Condorcet's definition of the "worst" candidate.  Not a bad definition
> at all, but not the only one, either.
> 
> 
>>>Agreed.  It sounds like you think I'm saying we could pick someone
>>>better using an identical, Condorcet ballot.  I am not saying that.
>>>
>>>I am saying that Condorcet cannot guarantee anything about the "total
>>>worth" of its winner.  Since you think "worth" can't be defined, even
>>>in a hypothetical situation, you should be willing to concede that point.
>>>If "worth" can't be defined, how can Condorcet make any guarantees about
>>>it?
>>>
>>While we cannot usefully attach numbers to it, the point is that we are 
>>looking for the candidate to which the voters collectively attach the most 
>>worth.  Gets tricky for cycles such as agreement that A>B, B>C, _AND_ C>A - 
>>but then we have to decipher which is the strongest assertion.
>>
> 
> Your description of what we are "looking for" doesn't seem to be what
> Condorcet attempts.  Condorcet is about majority rule, not maximizing worth.
> It doesn't collect the information needed to attempt the latter.  I am
> not saying that's BAD, I am saying that as a consequence we cannot say
> anything about the "collective worth" of a CW.
> 

We do not have numbers for worth, but each voter presumably ranks first 
the one that voter sees as having the most worth - and this ranking 
determines the CW.

> 
>>>>I see no value in a numeric value for worth with Approval - either they 
>>>>are good enough that I choose to rank them as acceptable, OR they are not.
>>>>
>>>I don't believe you.  If this is true, then there are potentially cases
>>>where you would be willing to approve all the candidates on the ballot,
>>>despite the fact that this "strategy" doesn't improve your prospects.
>>>
>>>
>>I can see them as equally good or equally bad.  If so, my best strategy is 
>>to not interfere with the other voters deciding on the winner.
>>
> 
> True.  But what if there are only three candidates, who make you 99%, 97%,
> and 93% happy respectively?  I'm assuming 93% is high enough for you
> to deem "acceptable."  Do you sit this election out, or do you put those
> "worth" figures to use in making a decision?
> 

That I have determined those numbers says I like, and vote for, 99%.  I 
would even vote for 50% if I had done the numbers and that was the best I 
could do.

Just as likely for me to have said I see 99% and 97% tied and better than 
93%, without doing the numbers - and flipped a coin between the best two.

> 
> Kevin Venzke
> stepjak at yahoo.fr

-- 
  davek at clarityconnect.com    http://www.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
   Dave Ketchum    108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708    607-687-5026
              Do to no one what you would not want done to you.
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