[EM] 'Strategies'

[Forest Simmons]

On Thu, 1 May 2003, Alex Small wrote (in reply to the "> >" paragraph):


> > Is there a single ranked ballot system that is not subject to favorite
> > burying?
> >
> > What systems, other than fptp, are immune, if any?
>

[snip]

>
> 2)  Indicate a strict ranking of the candidates.  Also, approve or
> disapprove PAIRS of candidates, from among the N(N-1)/2 possible
> pairings of candidates.  The most approved pair go to the final round,
> where the rankings are used to decide between them in a pairwise
> contest.
>

What if we changed this last step as follows?

Elect the candidate that is above the average rating (or ranking, if
ratings are not available) of the "finalists" on the greatest number of
ballots.

In other words, consider the "PAIR" with greatest approval in the first
part as a pair of provisional finalists, and then in part two treat them
like equally ranked frontrunners in an approval election.

It seems unlikely that this would give any incentive to bury favorite, and
it might provide a winner with greater over all acceptability than either
member of the most approved "PAIR".

By the way, this method is tractable computationally since it is summable
in data structures of size N^3, where N is the number of candidates.

With Chris Benham's ideas about default PAIR approvals (subject to
modification by the discerning voters) implemented on an interactive
ballot, this method could enter the realm of practicality.

Forest