[EM] PR and Second Chambers

[James Gilmour]

I want to respond only to five specific points from our recent discussion:
Kevin asked
> Have you said, in the past, how many candidates you would like to elect
> in an STV district?  Too
> few, and you won't represent very many groups; too many, and most
> people will vote solely by
> party.

You'll find some relevant comments in my post of 23/03/2003 in response to
comments from Olli.  I am a complete pragmatist when it comes to devising workable
and acceptable district schemes for STV-PR.  Proportionality (or whatever) is not
the only criterion.  Locality is important, at least here in the UK.  So I am
happy to go with very flexible schemes where everything that can be varied is
allowed to vary, ie number of electors per member, number of members per district,
with both varying within one legislature (eg a local authority - local government
council).  This will horrify the theorists who want "pure PR" and uniform numbers
of electors in each district and uniform numbers of members elected from every
district.

We are faced with these practicalities right now in Scotland as we debate the
desirability of adopting STV-PR for the election of our 32 local government
councils.  I would have no problem with 10-member districts in the cities, but
that does tend to frighten the horses.  So I would accept an upper limit of 8, as
in Northern Ireland when STV-PR was re-introduced there for local government
elections.  But note that 10-member districts were used in some quite rural areas
for the Scottish Education Authorities in the 1920s.  At the other end of the
scale, I accept there must be some 3-member districts, some 2-member districts and
even two single-member districts.  I don't need anyone to tell me this limits PR,
but there is more to effective representation than PR of political parties or PR
of anything else.  The population density in the north-west corner of mainland
Scotland is so low and travel is so difficult (compared to the rest of the
Highland area and to the rest of Scotland) that single-members districts are, in
my view, essential there.  This view is supported by those who live there and by
their current elected representatives.


> > Minorities may be large or small.  With FPTP, minority views are
> implemented much
> > more often than they should be, but not for the reason I think you
> had in mind.
>
> The reason I had in mind is that FPTP tends to produce two strong
> parties, both of whose policies
> are off-center, and one of which will usually have a majority (maybe
> not in the UK).  The
> situation isn't much improved with PR.

How do you measure the parties' strengths - by votes or by seats won?
Ten parties are represented in the UK House of Commons.  The two largest parties
have 73% of the votes but 88% of the seats.

In the UK it used to be true that the policies of the two largest parties were
both off-centre (on opposite sides), but now both are in the centre (some would
say both are now right of centre).

I don't understand how you can say that the situation isn't much improved with PR.
Most countries with PR do not have single-party majority government, and certainly
not single-party majority with only minority support.


> I agree that PR would have single-party majorities less often than
> FPTP, but not to the extent
> that would make me comfortable.  I'm thinking especially of closed-list
> PR, but my suspicion is
> that party strength would not be much reduced by STV if the system is
> parliamentary.  I would be
> very interested to see the results of STV where the chamber does not
> choose the executive.

Examples would be the Senate of the Republic of Ireland and the Senate of the
Australian Federal Parliament.  But neither of these is the 'principal' chamber of
those Parliaments.


> > > > There is no reason why proportionate representation
> > > > of "extremes" should reduce
> > > > the proportionate representation of centrist
> > > > segments.
> > >
> > > If the centrist segments all preferred to align with
> > > each other, and with no extremes, then I would be
> > > content.  But if "extremes" (and again, I am more
> > > broad with that term) are able to form a majority with
> > > only certain centrist segments, I am discontent that
> > > the resulting policies may be unnecessarily distant
> > > from the center.
> >
> > There are really two separate issues here - the relative sizes of the elected
> > groups and their respective positions along the political spectrum. Where a
> > majority government is normal, you might expect the initiative to be
> taken by the
> > largest group.  But the largest group may be at one end of the
> political spectrum
> > and other parties may be reluctant to form coalitions with them.  (That has
> > happened in Italy where the Communist Party has frequently won 30% of
> the votes
> > and 30% of the seats.)
>
> I think this misses my point.  Suppose, in Italy, that a couple of more
> centrist blocs form a
> majority with the Communists.  I'd say the resulting policies will not
> be the best, since the
> Communists are objectionable to many.  Suppose that most everyone on
> the right forms a majority,
> entirely excluding the Communists.  I'd say this is poor as well,
> because of the large support for
> the Communists.  This is my motivation for the position that the
> Communist and "farthest right"
> blocs' support should be factored in earlier than this stage.

Two points about this.
You and I may have our personal views about what is "objectionable" or "poor", but
if the policies are supported by a majority of the elected representatives, that
surely represents the wishes of a majority of the voters?  What more can you ask?

I cannot see how any single-winner voting system with single-member districts
could factor in the positions of the Communists and the far right.


> > > >  We never solve political
> > > > problems by denying representation
> > > > to those with significant support for their
> > > > political views.
> > >
> > > Insofar as "representation" refers specifically to
> > > legislative seats occupied by one's first-choice
> > > candidates, I think this assertion would be quite
> > > difficult to defend.
> >
> > I don't think it is difficult to defend at all. We can see examples around the
> > world (some very close to home) where serious extra-parliamentary activity has
> > become the order of the day because groups with significant support have been
> > denied representation.
>
> My statement was a little too strong.  But even so, the "examples" that
> you suggest don't seem to
> be a defense of your claim ("We never solve..."), but of something
> weaker that we would both
> probably agree on.

My example "close to home" was Northern Ireland.  When the Parliaments of Northern
Ireland and Southern Ireland (now the Republic of Ireland) were created in 1920,
both were elected by STV-PR.  In the north, the Ulster Unionists got rid of STV-PR
at the earliest opportunity (after the second election) and so denied a very
significant minority fair representation for the next 50 years.  It is, of course,
speculation, but I think the history of that Province might have been very
different if STV-PR had been retained, as it was in the south.

James