[EM] Another PR method based on ranked ballots

[Olli Salmi]

I heartily agree with most of this posting.

At 07:41 +0000 23.3.2003, James Gilmour wrote:
>Alex wrote
>>  James Gilmour said:
>>  > How do you define "suitable"?
>>  >
>>  > All single-winner methods will distort the wishes of the voters.  In my
>>  > book, NO single-winner method is "suitable" for this purpose.
>  >

I agree.

>  > Well, let's start with the observation that some offices are single-winner
>  > by their very nature.

If we don't count chairmen and speakers, we have one of those in this 
country , the president, whose power has been reduced recently. I 
would prefer a president elected by parliament, but the press of 
course likes the entertainment.

It seems to me that when the structure of government was getting more 
democratic in continental Europe, we developed proportional 
elections, while in the USA there was a trend to make a great number 
of state and local officials elective. Both movements had the same 
purpose, but the means were quite different. I do not know US history 
very well, but having all these officials on the same ballot may have 
been the reason why voting machines were introduced. This makes 
single-winner elections entrenched and reform dependent on the 
technology.

There have been attempts to shorten the ticket in the USA. I have 
kept a Reader's Digest from May 1968, which has an article "Let's 
Junk Our Obsolete State Constitutions", condensed from National Civic 
Review. One of the problems mentioned are long ballots, "bedsheet 
ballots". Judging by the Florida ballot, the ballots aren't much 
shorter nowadays.

The solution that we have chosen is to have a representative 
parliament and have the officials responsible to the parliament, or 
council in local government. Here we don't vote for, to quote 
Reader's Digest, "sheriffs, surveyors, coroners, registers of wills, 
recorders of deeds, justices of the peace and others."

Another reason for the American aversion to PR may be that it has 
been tried but rejected. Here's a quote:

"Instant runoff voting was in vogue in the 30s and 40s and then abandoned.

FALSE!  The opponents are confusing instant runoff voting with a 
voting system known as preference voting (a.k.a. proportional 
representation or single transferable vote).  They are not the same, 
as any Australian can tell you, since they use instant runoff voting 
for their House of Representatives and preference voting for their 
Senate. The two systems share the use of ranked ballots, but there 
are other SIGNIFICANT differences. (see next)"
http://www.improvetherunoff.org/misinformation.htm
This quote seems to imply that STV is bad and IRV good.

STV was introduced in some places in the USA in the thirties. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts is, to my knowledge, the only place that has 
kept it for the council election. It was tried in New York City, but 
the method had the audacity to allow the election of communist 
councillors which of course was very un-American of a voting system, 
so the voters were persuaded to abandon it after a series of 
referenda. There's an excellent site about this, well worth reading.
http://www.nyu.edu/gsas/dept/history/public_history/PR/
The frequent referenda by the way show that there was no agreement on 
"constitutional" rules.

I've seen it mentioned that STV is used in school board elections in 
New York, but I haven't been able to find the relevant legislation, 
not even in the 500-page election code. There have been attempts to 
change the system, but I don't know how successful they have been.
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/ltr/l_020499.htm

>Yes, of course.  But that is so obvious it does not need to be 
>stated and it was
>not relevant to the proposal that had been made, ie to elect all the 
>members of a
>chamber of a legislature by a single-winner method.
>
>
>>   The only way to do away with single-winner
>>  elections is to elect a legislature by PR and then either
>
>This is true, but we must not loose sight of the reason for holding 
>the election.
>If we are operating a system of representative democracy, the 
>elected chamber of
>the legislature should be representative of the people, or at least,
>representative of those who vote.  I do not know of any single-winner voting
>system (with single-member districts) that can give a representative 
>result, other
>than by chance.  Even then, direct representation can be guaranteed 
>only to 50% of
>these who vote.  (More than 50% may obtain direct representation, but the
>single-member systems cannot guarantee more than 50%.)
>
>  >
>  > 1)  let the legislature appoint/elect the executive
>
>An executive can emerge in several different ways, eg single-party majority,
>single-party minority, two-party majority coalition, multi-party majority
>coalition, rainbow coalition.  In all cases that executive will need 
>to be able to
>obtain majority support (ie 50% + 1) of the whole chamber.
>
>>  or
>>  2)  elect a collegial executive branch, say, a council of 7 or so members
>>  which makes its decisions by majority vote and selects its own officers.
>>  This is basically a mini-legislature.
>
>A rare model.

This is (these are) the Swiss model, which I like best. On the 
federal level, the parliament elects the cabinet for 4 years and 
president from among the 7 for a period of one year. On the cantonal 
level the executives are elected by the voters, by PR in one canton.

>  > But, if you believe that there are offices for which single-winner
>  > elections are appropriate, then all I really mean by "suitable" is "Your
>  > favorite single-winner method."
>
>OK, but not relevant to this discussion.
>
>>
>>  The rationale for electing a branch of the legislature by single-winner
>>  methods is that PR can encourage/empower extremist parties,
>
>You are in several depths of very deep water here.
>
>Which party is an "extremist party"?  I have only one definition of an
>"extremist" - it is someone whose views are extremely different from my own.
>That, I believe, is the only valid and honest definition of an "extremist".

Well put.

...

>Not all PR systems are the same, nor do they all have the same "political"
>effects.  There are differences between the effects of closed list party list
>systems and of open list party list systems.  And STV-PR (Choice 
>Voting) is very
>different again in it effects, especially as it allows the voters to 
>show whether
>they want their elected representatives to behave in a consensual or
>non-consensual manner.  District magnitude is also very important 
>when considering
>any system of PR.  The UK Parliament has 659 elected members, but I 
>would NEVER
>recommend that they should all be elected from a single 
>national-district. That is
>neither necessary nor desirable.

Neither would I, but otherwise our views differ here. I understand 
the use of STV in small elections (district size not much more than 
6, voters all present). It would be nice of course with larger 
districts but then it will soon become unmanageable, both for the 
voters and for the vote counters. Districts of 6 are too small, the 
effective threshold is about 15%. It would probably only allow a 
three-party system and no representation for small minorities. That 
is why I accept open list PR much more readily than James Gilmour 
(and I even dare to think that closed list PR is better than First 
Past the Post.

Of course manageability is relative. Cambridge took 5 days to hand 
count the votes, we count the results of parliamentary elections in 
about three hours, with the obligatory recount ready on the third day 
after the election. Anything that takes longer than that is 
unmanageable to me, and anything that can't be counted by hand.

>
>>  particularly
>>  if the largest minority party gets special status in the legislature.
>
>Why should the largest minority party have special status in the legislature,
>other than being the largest minority party?  It may be an accepted convention
>that the largest minority is given the first chance to form a 
>majority coalition
>executive, but that is only practical politics.  Where minority government is
>readily accepted, it is also practical politics to look first to the largest
>minority to form the executive.
>
>>   By
>>  contrast, a good single-winner method (the definition of "good" being the
>>  main preoccupation of this list) says "OK, yes, we all break down into our
>>  various factions.  But, who has the strongest overall support, who can be
>>  'a uniter, not a divider'?"  (to steal a phrase from the man who divided
>>  the world recently)
>
>I know of no evidence to support this assertion.  On the contrary, if the
>single-winner method leads to the exclusion of significant 
>minorities, the result
>is not more unity, but more division.

Right. Extremists tend to lose some of their extremism if they can 
participate in decision making.

>  >
>>  I think that moderating aspect is desirable.  Whereas a house elected by
>>  PR might include a lot of far-left, far-right, and far-in-other-direction
>>  parties, a house elected by single-winner methods will include mostly
>>  "slightly left", "slightly right", "slightly other direction", "moderate",
>>  and "mix of issues that doesn't fit any neat label but seems to satisfy a
>>  lot of voters."
>
>With a sensible implementation of any PR system you will get "a lot 
>of far-left,
>far-right, and far-in-other-direction parties" ONLY if that is the 
>wish of those
>who voted.  Moderation may be desirable, but manipulating the voting system to
>engineer some form of moderation is not the way forward in a representative
>democracy.

Again I agree.

Olli Salmi