[EM] Another PR method based on ranked ballots

[James Gilmour]

Steve wrote (in part)
> On 21 Mar 2003 at 0:38, James Gilmour wrote:
> -snip-
> > Why rank the parties?  Why not rank the candidates?  Then
> > you could get PR of far more than just the parties.
>
> If the legislature has a reasonably large number of seats, say 50 or
> more, there would be so many candidates that no voter could be asked
> to rank that many, nor even rank enough so society could learn their
> preferences regarding the ones whose platforms are among the best
> compromises.

But you are making the assumption that candidates would be (or perhaps, should
be?) elected from one single national list.  Why would you not want some scheme of
districts (= UK constituencies)?  I am well aware that the degree of attachment to
locality as a component of representation varies very greatly from country to
country, reflecting differences in political culture.  There is of course a
trade-off between degree of PR and district magnitude.  In terms of guaranteed
representation for voters, the law of diminishing returns applies.  The acceptable
cut-off point for district size may vary from culture to culture, but a balance
can usually be struck that is well within the limits of practicality.

>
> Australia had this problem using STV PR, so they provided a short-cut
> on their ballot that allows the voter to optionally  pick a party
> instead of ranking the candidates.

Australia did introduce this facility, but not for the reason you suggest.  I have
seen this statement made before on this list, so I think it is important to set
the record straight.    The problems in Australia arose from: 1. compulsory
voting, and 2. the requirement for every voter to mark a preference for every
candidate (otherwise their ballot paper would be declared invalid - ["informal" in
Australian-speak] and rejected completely.  (And don't forget that a "vote by
party" facility would also find favour with party mangers who always want to
discourage too much free-thinking among voters!)

I believe is the privilege, responsibility and duty of every citizen to vote in
public elections, but I am completely opposed to compulsory voting.  To put on top
of that a requirement for every voter to mark a preference for every candidate is
equally unacceptable to me, and is undesirable and unnecessary.

Australia does not conduct STV-PR elections for large numbers of seats.  Australia
nationally uses STV-PR only to elect its Senate (the Upper House of its Federal
Parliament).  There are 76 Senators:  12 for each of the six States and 2 for each
of the two Territories.  In a normal election, each State elects only 6 of its 12
Senators.  So there is no national list of candidates.  Each State and Territory
is an electoral district and there is a separate list of candidates within each.
The elections in some States do seem to be contested by a large number of parties
and groups, but few of them attract significant support - which shows just what a
nonsense it is to insist that voters mark a preference for every candidate.


> My understanding is that most
> voters use that option, so they get a PR with far less than if they'd
> ranked the parties, not far more.

I don't think this statement is correct.  My understanding is that if you vote for
a party, your ballot is assumed to be marked in the order specified by your party
for ALL the candidates.  So the parties are placed in order of preference.  But I
do agree that this Australian system does result in the voters getting less than
they could if they implemented STV-PR more sensibly, ie without compulsory voting
and without a requirement to mark a preference for every candidate.

>
> Here's another PR system involving voters' rankings:
>
>    Let each voter rank some candidates.
>
>    All candidates are "elected" but do not have the same
>    weight in the legislature.  Whenever the legislature
>    votes, some may abstain, so set the weight of each
>    non-abstaining legislator to the number of voters who
>    ranked her over every other non-abstaining legislator.
>
>   (Note that each citizen may rank himself at the top of
>   his ordering, so this would be a hybrid form of direct
>   democracy that allows busy citizens the option of
>   being represented by their favorite proxy.)

This may be interesting but it is a long way over any horizon.  We have practical
voting methods currently in use that could revolutionise most of our elected
legislatures.  I am a practical reformer and am still hopeful of seeing real
reform in my lifetime. (NB I have been campaigning for voting reform for more than
40 years.)


> James Gilmour asked Alex:
> > How do you define "suitable"?
> > All single-winner methods will distort the wishes of
> > the voters.  In my book, NO single-winner method
> > is "suitable" for this purpose.
>
> When a legislature (PR or otherwise) votes to adopt a new policy or
> maintain the status quo, the wishes of many voters are not granted.
> That's the nature of compromise.
>
> If the policies adopted by a legislature (PR or otherwise) are
> similar to the policies the citizens themselves would adopt if they
> had time to deliberate and vote directly on the issues, then the
> legislature is representative, in my book.

I agree, but we do not have that independent assessment of the voters' views at
the time the legislature made the decision.  The best we can do is assess the
voters' responses to the candidates who offer themselves for election to public
office and ensure that the candidates elected are, at that time, representative of
those who voted.  If those elected betray that trust, it is for the voters to deal
with them at the next election.  And it is our responsibility to give the electors
a voting system that will allow them to do that.


> Since PR legislatures will tend to adopt compromise policies, their
> policies would be similar to the policies of legislatures elected by
> a good single-winner method (which tends to select candidates who
> espouse reasonable compromises).

This is not true.  Single-winner methods, even the good ones, cannot ensure the
balance of representation (and thus pressure for compromise) that will exist in a
legislature elected by a sensitive system of PR.


> I think the big open question, when comparing PR to a legislature
> elected by a good single-winner method, is the nature of the vote
> trading that will occur.

It may be an "open question", but I don't think this is the "big question" at all.
The fundamental question is whether your elected legislature is representative of
those who voted.  No single-winner voting method can deliver a representative
assembly other than by chance.  If you believe in representative democracy, this
must be the key question.


> A "vote trade" is when a legislator
> reverses her vote on some issue in exchange for another legislator's
> reversal in her favor on an issue she cares about more.  Vote trades
> can make policies more representative, if the citizens would make
> similar trades when voting directly.  But if legislators have
> conflicts of interest, such as the desire for re-election, their
> trades could make policies less representative.  Pork is a common
> example.

There need be no conflict of interest here, if the voting system makes the
legislator directly accountable to the voters, ie to a representative group of
electors who voted him or her in and who can equally vote him or her out without
having to vote against their chosen party.

> Another example is the Shas Party in Israel's PR gov't
> winning public funding for their religious priorities in trade for
> their support of the Likud Party.  Would the Israeli citizens make
> that trade if they could vote directly?  That's a difficult question
> to answer.

I cannot answer that specific question, but I can say that Israel has the world's
worse implementation of the worst system of PR.  And the political consequences of
that defective voting system are obvious for all to see.

James