[EM] Dyadic ballots (was "...encouraging truncation")

[Kevin Venzke]

Forest,

Thanks.  It's much clearer to me now how it works.

I suspect that this system (applying a Condorcet
method to the ballots) is identical to Borda with a
fixed number of ranks.  I'd bet that voters would use
Approval strategy (give only 15's and 0's).

Given a Borda ballot of A>B>C>D>E, the points given
are A 4, B 3, C 2, D 1, E 0.  If you make a Condorcet
matrix reflecting these points, you'll get the same
winner:
   A   B   C   D   E
A  .   1   2   3   4
B  0   .   1   2   3
C  0   0   .   1   2
D  0   0   0   .   1
E  0   0   0   0   .

Measuring the degree of preference essentially means
letting this voter vote four times for the A>E
proposition.  The value of mere relative ranking is
diluted.  I'm not sure this can be overcome.

 --- Forest Simmons <fsimmons at pcc.edu> a écrit : > 
> > 12: A at 10 (fill 8 and 2 circles)
> > 11: B at 7 (fill 4, 2, 1)
> The wise course for all voters is to vote at least
> one candidate at 15 and
> at least one candidate at zero, so these two
> factions seem to be throwing
> caution to the wind in order to express their
> beliefs that neither
> candidate is very good.

Yes, but my intention was to see what happens when the
individual bits have different winners.  I see now
from your explanation that it doesn't matter because
they're not compared that way.

Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr


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