[EM] Markus: MMC. Why WV vs Margins matters.
Markus Schulze
markus.schulze at alumni.tu-berlin.de
Tue Mar 4 03:17:12 PST 2003
Dear Mike,
you wrote (4 March 2003):
> MMC says:
>
> If there is a set of candidates such that a majority of the voters
> strictly prefers each candidate of this set to each candidate
> outside this set, then the winner must be a candidate of this set.
>
> If that were MMC, then no method would meet MMC. Saying that a
> majority prefer the candidates in set S to all the other candidates,
> but not saying anything about how they vote, no one can guarantee who
> will win then.
>
> Either you should speak of a majority _voting_ the candidates in S
> over all the other candidates, or else, when saying only that they
> prefer the candidates in S to all the others, you should add the
> stipulation that they vote sincerely.
We've talked about this before in connection with a paper by Pattanaik
and Peleg ("P&P"). I agree to Blake Cretney's way of seeing this.
Blake wrote to Mike (28 Jan 2002):
> Having said all that, I'll get to how I interpret P&P. P&P talk about
> ballots, and criteria and methods based on those ballots. By ballots I
> could just as easily say preference orders. I don't think P&P intend to
> propose a theory in which the preference orders are mental states, but
> the method works on actual ballots, so the ballots must be "sincere",
> whatever that might mean. They ignore the sincerity issue. They just
> have methods and criteria that refer to preference orders. But where
> those preference orders come from isn't their concern. For you,
> preference order implies sincere preferences, and you recognize that a
> real-world method can only work on cast votes. But for P&P, a method is
> just a function from a hypothetical set of preference orders to a set of
> winners.
I absolutely agree with Blake: "A method is just a function from
a hypothetical set of preference orders to a set of winners.
Where the preference orders come from is of no concern."
Markus Schulze
----
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
More information about the Election-Methods
mailing list