[EM] Re: Blake's Margins Arguments

[Craig Carey]

At 2003\03\03 04:59 +0000 Monday, MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
...
 >Blake's MMC:
 >
 >A majority of voters are agreed
 >that they prefer any one of a set of candidates over any candidate
 >outside that set, but disagreee over who should win from inside the
 >set. It seems to follow from majoritarian principles that someone from
 >inside the set should win. Further, this principle can't lead to a
 >contradiction.
 >

There is a hard problem if it was true that it was a principle
since once rules supplying the wanted justice and fairness with
those 0th-derivative principles rules, vaguely there is quite a
possibility there arise unsolvable disputes on which corner sliced
the other away before it could get back, can appear. The Cretney
principle there, of majority rule, is trying to attach surfaces
to shapes at the wrong spots. With fairness about surface then an
aim is to keep angles of flats inside of the allowable angles (a
touching polytope defines that).

It would be disruptive to drop in a "a need x% of winners rule".

So the story of the CVD that majority whatever, is a principle of
a country or something, was just another untruth in a CVD
brochure.

Fairness is not like an electric field that sums up nicely.
Instead when a contradiction arises, the derivation has to be
undone so that the origin of the error is removed.

You have not said that you do that sort of thing when your
so called principled rule combine with equal suffrage to
create a need you to fix the rules. Any arbitrary decision
might be the first of an infinite number, and to make even
permits all findings to be rejected with a note that they
are arbitrary.

This Condorcet community gets a bit resistant to the idea that
there are 0 winners. But that just parallels what Condorcet
theory itself is like

The original text of that quoted MMC is here:
    http://groups.yahoo.com/group/election-methods-list/message/10940
       Date:  Tue Feb 25, 2003  2:53 am
       Subject:  Re: Blake's margins arguments


The IFPP method fails the MMC rule so the rule is almost certainly
wrong by this fact alone

------------------------------------------------------------------
     AD  25
     B.  27
     C.  24
     D.  24

The 1 winner IFPP method finds that candidate B is the winner.
------------------------------------------------------------------

The rule is obviously failed by 0 winner elections

IFPP for 6 papers and 4 candidates and 1 winner, is shown
here along with a derivation

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/politicians-and-polytopes/message/176





G. A. Craig Carey


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