[EM] "More often" (was: IRV and Condorcet operating identically)

[Stephane Rouillon]

I suppose you meant:

Suppose that candidate A is the winner. Suppose that
   a set of voters, where each voter strictly prefers
   candidate A to candidate B, is added to the original
   profile. Then candidate B must not become the new winner.

Steph

Markus Schulze a écrit :

> Dear Steph,
>
> the participation criterion says that it is not possible
> to worsen the outcome by participating:
>
>    Suppose that candidate A is the winner. Suppose that
>    a set of voters, where each voter strictly prefers
>    candidate B to candidate A, is added to the original
>    profile. Then candidate B must not become the new winner.
>
> Moulin demonstrated that the Condorcet criterion and the
> participation criterion are incompatible. (Herve Moulin,
> "Condorcet's Principle Implies the No Show Paradox,"
> Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 45, pp. 53-64, 1988.)
>
> Markus Schulze
>
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