[EM] Strategy-free Condorcet resolution methods

[Kevin Venzke]

Could I get some opinions on what resolution methods
are most free of incentive to rank insincerely, or run
clones, even if the results are "inferior"?

Smith//RandomBallot seems to encourage (however
slightly) up-ranking compromise candidates.

Smith//RandomCandidate isn't clone-proof.

Smith//MMPO is something I want to think about.  I was
also thinking about a kind of Smith//Bucklin, but that
would suggest up-ranking compromises, too.  The
results might be decent, though.

What if the winner of the strongest (WV) defeat
against a Smith member were made the winner?

This example was discussed awhile ago:
49 Bush
24 Gore
27 Nader>Gore

propositions:
51-49 Gore>Bush
49-27 Bush>Nader
27-24 Nader>Gore

RP(margins) elects Bush; RP(wv) elects Gore.  Are
there other (simpler) methods which necessarily elect
Gore?  "Most Votes In Any Contest" elects Gore.  I
believe "Plain Condorcet" elects Gore.

Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr

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