[EM] Fwd: Is Condorcet The Turkey?

[Adam Tarr]

I just realized that this thread started not in support of approval voting, 
but in support of IRV.  So I will offer a few responses directed at IRV.

David Gamble wrote:

 > Due to the nature of the Condorcet method- which considers lower 
preferences
 > before the fate of higher preferences is decided- condorcet would appear 
to me
 > to be a turkey electoral system.

Condorcet does not consider lower preferences before higher ones.  It 
considers all preferences simultaneously.

 > The fundamental difference as regards the results between condorcet and
 > irving is that  condorcet allows the election of candidates of 
candidates with
 > little or no first or higher preference support. It is these candidates 
who are
 > likely to be the turkeys.

This is theoretically true.  But as I pointed out in my previous message, 
it seems extremely unlikely, that an anonymous turkey is going to be able 
to finagle his way onto the ballot of every single voter in the 
election.  In order to get that sort of exposure, he is going to have to 
say something, which will of course turn some people off, regardless of 
what it is he says.

 > AC  498
 > BC  497
 > CA     3
 > CB     2

So every single A and B voter casts a second preference??  It only takes a 
tiny percentage of voters failing to do so to sink your "turkey".  It is 
nearly impossible for a candidate to be simultaneously anonymous, and 
capable of getting everyone's attention.

More realistically, let's imagine a candidate who has moderate, or at least 
mixed (i.e. some one one side of the spectrum, and some on the other) 
views, who has a weak core of support, but manages to win a Condorcet election.

A>B>C 42%
B>A>C 5%
B>C>A 7%
C>B>A 46%

So here we have a more realistic "turkey" scenario.  A candidate with a 
core support of only 12% manages to win an election.  Compare that, if you 
will, to the nightmare scenario of IRV:

10% FarRight>Right>Centrist>Left>FarLeft
10% Right>FarRight>Centrist>Left>FarLeft
15% Right>Centrist>FarRight>Left>FarLeft
16% Centrist>Right>Left>FarRight>FarLeft
15% Centrist>Left>Right>FarLeft>FarRight
13% Left>Centrist>FarLeft>Right>FarRight
11% Left>FarLeft>Centrist>Right>FarRight
10% FarLeft>Left>Centrist>Right>FarRight

Centrist has the most first place votes, the most second place votes, and 
the most third place votes.  Centrist is the only candidate who does not 
appear fourth or fifth on any ballot.  Centrist would win in a landslide 
over any other candidate in a two-way race.  Centrist is quite obviously 
the popular choice by ANY reasonable measure.

In Condorcet, plurality, top two runoff, or really any reasonable method, 
Centrist wins.  But in IRV, Centrist is eliminated before the final runoff, 
and Right wins in a squeaker.

To me, the IRV nightmare scenario is obviously far worse.  In my nightmare 
scenario for Condorcet, no voter has any real reason to regret their vote 
after the election, while in the IRV vote a solid third of the electorate 
have good reason to regret their strategy.

 > It occurs to me that the best way to win a single seat condorcet 
election is
 > to stand on a platform of bland, vague and generalised policies that nobody
 > could disagree with or be offended by.

Not to beat a dead horse, but this same criticism gets put up against 
approval voting as well.  It's not surprising that the two methods get the 
same criticism, since they are closely related.  After all, a Condorcet 
election reduced to an approval vote if every voter places all the 
candidates in either first or last place.

That said, I have argued in both my recent messages that it's pretty 
ridiculous to expect a candidate with undifferentiated opinions to get a 
vote, even a lower place vote, from nearly the entire electorate.  People 
are not so easily duped, especially when the leaders of the political 
factions would be advising them to not cast a vote for Mr. anonymous in 
these situations.

-Adam