[EM] Fwd: Is Condorcet The Turkey?

[Dave Ketchum]

On Thu, 19 Jun 2003 21:22:26 +0200 (CEST) Kevin Venzke wrote:

  >  --- Dave Ketchum <davek at clarityconnect.com> a écrit :
  >
  >>So utility has SOME KIND of value which i have demonstrated I do not
  >>understand.  How about letting me in on the secret.
  >
  >
  > Maybe you can understand it in terms of "strength of preference," where
  > multiple "greater-than" signs are used in place of worth values.  Perhaps
  > that will be more meaningful to you.
  >
  > Imagine these as the SENTIMENTS (these are not ballots) of the voters:
  > 49 A>>>>B>C
  > 2 B>>A>>>C (doesn't really matter)
  > 49 C>>>>B>A
  >
  > The Condorcet ballots arising from the above sentiments:
  > 49 A>B>C
  > 2 B>A>C
  > 49 C>B>A
  >
  > Please do not reply to this by pointing out that no one ranks B last.
  > That is indeed a useful fact, but it has nothing to do with utility.

Perhaps this collection of votes has been asked to carry a bigger burden
than it is capable of:
        Condorcet does not support expressing the detailed sentiments that
are imagined above.
        A backers like B better than C, as do C backers like B better than A.
        Given this:
             A backers have no possible profit from improving chance of C
winning.
             Ditto C about A.
             If B somehow became less attractive, basic non-plot votes would
change and we would have A competing with C with no schemes needed.  Would
head in this direction if some of the A and C backers changed their backing.
  >
  > Looking at the SENTIMENTS it is evident that B is only barely preferred
  > to most voters' last choice.  If utility were measured as "the number of
  > greater-than signs placed to the right of the candidate among all voters"
  > (which would certainly make sense), we see immediately that B would have
  > the lowest score.
  >
  > Relevance to the prisoner's dilemma: If the A and C cooperate and 
agree not
  > to rank B>Worst, they gain a 50/50 chance of electing their favorite or
  > electing their least favorite.  If they don't or can't cooperate, they get
  > a 100% chance of electing a candidate barely superior to Worst.
  >
  > So, if the A and C supporters can trust each other, they improve their
  > expectation by bullet-voting.  (But I don't think they will be able to
  > trust each other.)

If this "utility" was something of value in the above election, there
could be truth in the above statement.  As it is, A and C voters agreed
that B>Worst in each of their views, thus saying that (unless their own
candidate managed to win) B was the best they could do in this election.
  >
  > Relevance to other methods: I've argued earlier that Approval would be
  > unlikely to elect B, because the Favorite>B preferences are much stronger
  > than the B>Worst preferences.
  >
  > The fact that utility (strength of preference) isn't a big factor in
Condorcet
  > elections, makes it an interesting point for comparison with other 
methods.
  > That is its value.
  >
  >
  > Kevin Venzke
  > stepjak at yahoo.fr
    --
davek at clarityconnect.com  http://www.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek
    Dave Ketchum   108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708   607-687-5026
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