[EM] Is Condorcet The Turkey?

Forest Simmons fsimmons at pcc.edu
Fri Jun 20 12:59:02 PDT 2003


On Fri, 20 Jun 2003, Eric Gorr wrote:

> At 12:08 PM -0700 6/20/03, Forest Simmons wrote:
> >If the voters know that ties are going to result in the speaker of the
> >house, say, deciding the winner, then those voters who like the speaker's
> >likely choice better than the likely CW may try to arrange a tie.
>
> They can still try to arrange a tie with Eppley's method as well,
> forcing a random choice to be made.

True, though a random tie breaker would seem more impartial than a
systematic one.  If A and B are tied, and then B wins by a coin toss, I
don't A see complaining about the fairness.  If B is chosen by the speaker
of the house, A might have a big complaint, justified or not.

Perhaps the main difference is psychological.

In any case I don't think that the tie breaker technique was Eppley's
biggest concern.

>
> I don't see how this forms a convincing argument either way.
>



> I would still want to see the results expressed as a tie, rather then
> have them hidden from me.
>

I guess I didn't read Eppley close enough to understand that he wanted to
hide the fact of a tie from the voters.

Perhaps he could clarify the matter better than I.

If your method is the same as Eppley's MAM in all other respects, then
perhaps we could say that you are one of those geniuses that independently
(re)discovered a great method:-)


Forest





More information about the Election-Methods mailing list