[EM] Is Condorcet The Turkey?

[Forest Simmons]

If the voters know that ties are going to result in the speaker of the
house, say, deciding the winner, then those voters who like the speaker's
likely choice better than the likely CW may try to arrange a tie.

This is no real concern in large scale elections, as I'm sure Eppley would
agree.

Forest


On Thu, 19 Jun 2003, Eric Gorr wrote:

> (Meant to reply to this sooner)
>
> At 5:22 PM -0700 6/13/03, Forest Simmons wrote:
> >And Condorcet is much better than IRV for reasons that I have tried to
> >elucidate in recent postings.  See Steve Eppley's web page for additional
> >explanations of why his version of Ranked Pairs is about as close as you
> >can get to the ideal.
>
> Yes, Steve has a very good analysis (www.alumni.caltech.edu/~seppley)
> of his version of RP.
>
> The only problem that I have with it is that I still don't understand
> why it is necessary or even a good idea to hide a genuine tie from
> those running an election.
>
> It is only (I *think*) his random selection to solve ambiguities that
> his method differs from the one that I have implemented
> (http://www.ericgorr.net/condorcet/).
>
> It would seem to me to be far better to simply report the tie and let
> those running the election to decide how to resolve it.
>
>
> --
> == Eric Gorr ========= http://www.ericgorr.net ========= ICQ:9293199 ===
> "Therefore the considerations of the intelligent always include both
> benefit and harm." - Sun Tzu
> == Insults, like violence, are the last refuge of the incompetent... ===
> ----
> Election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>