[EM] Is Condorcet The Turkey?

[Kevin Venzke]

 --- Dgamble997 at aol.com a écrit : 
> Kevin Venzke Wrote
> 
> In other words, campaigns become about personality instead of policy. I
> don't think that's necessarily a bad thing. Whatever policies the elected
> representatives enact, they still need to get reelected.
> 
> I have to disagree with this . Campaigns about personality as opposed to 
> policy tend to descend into trivial, sensational and hypocritical debate about 
> candidates private lives in general and sexual conduct in particular. Take for 
> example the unedifying spectacle of the Monica Lewinsky affair.

I believe you said you're familiar with politics in Britain, so I wonder if
this is why you say this.  I'm talking about the voters' "gut feel" about a
candidate, not the candidates' personal lives.  This plays a big (bigger?)
role in U.S. elections.

> 
> Kevin also wrote
> 
> I think "compromise at any cost" is a good strategy for electing the members
> of a legislature. Policies supported by a majority vote of compromises should
> be pretty reasonable. But if you elect lop-sided candidates, chances are you
> will get lop-sided results. That is what I want to avoid "at any cost," and
> compromise at the election level appears to be the solution.    
> 
> You say lop-sided I say decisive and radical when decision and action are 
> necessary.

Yes, but if lop-sided in the other direction, exactly the opposite decisions
and actions will be deemed necessary.

> Government and legislators are required in certain circumstances to make 
> tough decisions and in crisis situations to make those decisions quickly out of 
> necessity. Sometimes waiting for a compromise is simply not an option- things 
> need doing now.

That's why I say you should get the compromise at the level of elections.
I'm not saying it would be good if 2/3rds of the legislature had to agree to
everything.

> The debate around certain issues ( for example abortion) is by 
> the very nature of the issue polarised. You either believe in a woman's right 
> to choose or in the right to life - a middle ground between the two is very 
> hard to find.

I don't think I agree.  There's certainly a spectrum of possible positions
on abortion.  I don't think you can come up with two specific viewpoints that
would divide the voters 50/50.  I suspect the "median" position is the
status quo.

> What was at one point on history regarded as radical and extremely 
> controversial ( for example female suffrage) years later is accepted as 
> self-evident truth.

So today's radicals are probably right.  Even so, how happy are you going
to be if your election method of choice puts the reactionary half of the
public in power?  By "lop-sided" I meant in EITHER direction, not just
yours.

> An excess of consensus and compromise ( compromise at any cost) 
> can result in weak and indecisive government, political drift, an inability to 
> deal with controversial problems and can 'put a brake' on social change.

Perhaps, but you also have this problem when the electoral method permits
large, major parties to feel secure and complacent.  If no major party is willing
to deal with a certain issue, then no other major party has to, either, and it
doesn't harm any of them at the polls.

That's why it would be good to use a method where a popular candidate can win,
even if it's uncertain that he has a lot of support.

> 
> What I meant by last preference was the following A 1st, B 2nd, C 3rd, D and 
> E not ranked at all. Last preference equals C.

I am astounded that you would not want to elect a candidate that everyone
had real preference for.  Such a candidate isn't a turkey/lemon at all.

> 
> You also might try considering Condorcet outside a purely American context.

I'm not sure what you thought was a "purely American context" in the message
you're replying to.  I suppose you think a nation's party system exists
in a vacuum, independent of the electoral system.

If Condorcet were implemented, I think the party structure would change
drastically.  Primarily, as a result of the "compromise at any cost" notion,
candidates would want to run as independents, and distance themselves from
big, polarizing parties.  As a result, I believe the parties would fragment,
limit themselves to certain issues, and play a smaller role in deciding
policy.

In any case, Plurality and IRV encourage a two-party system.  Two parties
is the rule, not an American exception.

> Consider the following example:
> 
> 40 voters sincerely support candidate A and sincerely dislike candidates B 
> and C. However they dislike C considerably more than B.
> 
> 39 Voters sincerely support C and sincerely dislike candidates A and B. 
> However they dislike A considerably more than B.

Condorcet does not care who you "sincerely dislike."  Only relative
preferences are entered on the ballot, and that is the basis of sincerity.
 
> The 21 B supporters vote 11B>A>C,  10 B>C>A.
> 
> If A and C supporters vote sincerely the votes look like this:
> 
> 40 A     11 B>A>C   10 B>C>A      39 C
> 
> Under Condorcet A wins.
> 
> If C's Supporters insincerely express a preference for B they can at least 
> defeat the candidate they dislike most (A).

What Dave said.  Unless the ballot instructions are "Don't rank the candidates
you dislike" (which they shouldn't be), this isn't a valid example.

You're no doubt thinking of IRV.

> Motives and situations that encourage insincere voting can be found under 
> virtually any electoral system Condorcet being no exception.

True, but that doesn't mean all methods are equal in this regard.


Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr


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