[EM] Summability

Adam Tarr atarr at purdue.edu
Thu Jul 24 22:08:01 PDT 2003

Kevin Venzke wrote:

>My thought is that a method's
>strategy should be as simple as possible (i.e. require as little information
>and calculation as possible) so that informed and uninformed voters basically
>play on a level field.  I can't think of a method which does this better than
>Condorcet methods.

Yes Kevin!  This is what I was trying to say, only Kevin said it much 
better than me.

In Condorcet methods, the best strategy is relatively transparent, but it's 
almost irrelevant since a sincere vote and a strategic vote are usually 
very similar.

In IRV, the best strategy can be very hard to figure out, yet voting 
strategically can be crucial.

By itself, the only thing this difference means is that less voters in 
Condorcet will regret their vote after the fact.  Although that's a nice 
property, it's not crucial.  But when you combine this with the fact that I 
generally prefer the sincere Condorcet winner to the sincere IRV winner, it 
becomes a big point in Condorcet's favor.


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