[EM] Condorcet completed by Approval Elimination (was Approval-completed Condorcet redux)

Chris Benham chrisbenham at bigpond.com
Thu Jul 17 02:40:13 PDT 2003

You wrote:
"What advantage does this system have over, say, ranked pairs Condorcet?"
Well in general terms it makes use of more information, so (at least 
with sincere voting) it should result in  slightly higher utility, "more
legitimate" winners. Also I  think it is much more saleable. "Ranked 
Pairs" even somewhat  confuses me, and I am intelligent and interested. 
 Some problems with RP are evident from the great  Margins versus Votes 
Against (aka Winning Votes) debate, mainly between Blake Cretney and 
Mike Ossitoff / Ossipoff.  I think it starts about here:
James wrote:
"And what is it about Condorcet that makes you think that it's stuck in 
the mud?"
I should say that Condorcet ties would be rare ( just as cars are rarely 
"stuck in the mud"). With my metaphor I was taking a swipe at
"normal"  Approval-completed  Condorcet (which, if there is no CW just 
elects the Approval winner) and also "Condorcet-enhanced
Approval" (which sometimes doesn't even elect the CW if  s/he is not 
approved enough.)
I haven't been able to think of any unusual big strategy problem. I 
assume that the parties will make deals with each other and advise their 
followers where to place the approval cutoffs accordingly.

Chris Benham

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