[EM] Less-skilled voters under Approval?
John B. Hodges
jbhodges at usit.net
Fri Jul 11 12:53:55 PDT 2003
I'm satisfied that for the task of filling a single seat in a race
with multiple candidates, Approval voting can perform well, if the
voters use good strategy for setting their approval threshold.
I'm wondering if anyone has done serious study of the case where
there is a range of sophistication among voters. People vary in how
much they follow the news, candidates may be more or less evasive,
interest-group advertising may be more or less honest, the mass-media
may be more or less responsible in its practice of journalism, and
voters have different tolerance-levels for political discussion. In
the U.S. today, a surprising fraction of the populace is working two
jobs, a surprising fraction is not completely fluent in English, a
surprising fraction never reads anything at all- neither books nor
magazines nor newspapers.
Approval voting, in plain English, attempts to find the candidate
that the greatest number of voters regard as not unacceptable. This
is a very modest ambition. One criticism of AV is that it can favor
mediocrity. For example in a four-candidate race, if all voters
approve their top three, the winner may be someone ranked second or
third by a great majority. (If they vote for "anybody but Hanson",
they may get exactly that.) Arguably this is not a disaster- "hey,
you marked the ballots"- AV never claims to pick the best, only the
most-widely-acceptable. But it is still a drawback, compared to other
voting systems that seek, by some definition, to pick the "best"
candidate.
There are strategies for setting your approval threshold higher, that
analytically give better results. If you know enough about the
candidates to judge how well you like them, but nothing else, then
approve the "best half", the candidates that are "better than the
average candidate". If pollsters have made it clear that some are
running well ahead of others, approve whichever of the front-runners
you like best, plus anyone else that you like better. These
strategies are not hard.
Still- how sensitive is AV to voters who aren't that careful? Has
anyone done "monte-carlo" computer simulations for a few thousand
elections, comparing cases where everyone follows some defined
strategy with other cases where x% use that strategy and (1-x)% mark
their ballots randomly? If "favorite front-runner plus" gives better
results than "best half", what fraction of the voters must be
following FFRP to significantly improve the results, compared to 100%
following "best half"? Questions like these. "Sensitivity" is not
exactly the same as "vulnerability to manipulation", but close.
--
------------------------------------
John B. Hodges, jbhodges@ @usit.net
The two-party system is obsolete and dysfunctional.
Better forms of democracy: www.fairvote.org
REAL CHOICES, NEW VOICES, by Douglas J. Amy
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