# [EM] Hello (Intro); PR......

Stephane Rouillon stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca
Wed Feb 19 17:25:05 PST 2003

```Hello Kevin, so soon...
Ok, I take a break from the General Estates of Quebec
(It is this week-end)...

> It looks to me like within a district, the game is IRV
>   except that voters may refuse to transfer their vote
>   after a certain point.
>
It could be said like that, but it seems to me like plain normal IRV.
How would you do another way for a normal IRV with a ballot
containing only eliminated candidates after some round?
The difference is more like this: instead of telling the loosers to "go home

see you next time", we keep their latest valid choice to produce a
multiple-seat chamber more proportional. Actually it is integer optimal
(like St-Lague).

You are right about the fact that voters will have to choose
between making new acceptable candidates (2nd and more choices)
or making sure to support their #1 party. The system is designed for this
purpose. It is mathematically incoherent to split support in favor of a
party
(just ideas in the sky) from individual support collected by its
representative
(the way it will be applied). If you do not make sure of maintaining
mathematical coherence you could end up with major surprises. I can
give two examples with the MMP electoral system that allows
each voters to specify a local candidate AND a party.  You could
(fortunately it is quite improbable) get one party winning 90% of local
seats
by a small margin over the 10 others, but just a 15th of the party votes...
(Suppose people do not like their program, but are confident with the
candidates personal qualities). With an initial 45 % of the chamber
after the "normal" correction the german law actually says the chamber size
should be multiplied by six and half to get an exact proportionality.
Theorically, because of their 5% quota, it could reach 9,5 times the normal
size (which is already huge: more than 500 representatives).
Some Italians parties have decided to take advantage from the same
mathematical incoherence: they are beginning to present local candidates
under another label. Because their correction is only partial it gives those
parties more seats...

You could add a proxy weight to get an exact proportional representation
(examples: two small parties get one of the one hunderd seat, with
1,2 % of the vote and 0,6%. To be exactly representative when adopting a
legislation, their respective vote in the assembly will count for 1,2 and
0,6.
The distortion is the worst for small parties: every elected official will
have a weigth around 1)

Independent candidates are free to participate or not in parties.
The goal is to design a system that will as most as possible,
NOT affect their personal election just based on this decision.
Please understand, the fact that they run inside or outside a party
will affect their election, but you should not be able to tell in advance if
it
would help or harm them...

>  I still don't think STV (etc.) can improve PR. To run
>   on the party list, candidates will need to conform to
>   their parties.  They will not be able to individually
>   campaign, because nobody will see the need to spend
>   money on such campaigns.  They will be elected or not
>   elected solely based on party affiliation.  Am I
>   wrong?
>

You are totally right about STV in my view!!! This is why SPPA builds the
list from the electorate results. So, even if we know that politicians will
keep a party affiliation because they want to want some perticular battles
above all, this system encourages them to step off the party line in
agreement with their personal principles. SPPA elects party line makers, not
followers,
because it will select the candidates within a party with the best scores
(residual approval weights).

The IRV motor should be replaced by a Condorcet (ranked pair with
winning votes or relative margins) if the people understand that its
complexity
would be more fair at the end.

The "crutch option" would ensure a bipartite coalition for a reduced term
at worst. So this more representative government should be stable enough,
because letting the plurality party (with the most seats) pick any
partner nesures several common views on major issues.

Stéphane Rouillon

Venzke Kevin a écrit :

> Stephane,
>
> Ok, I made an attempt to read it.  I'm not totally
> certain how your system works, but I have a comment or
> two.
>
> First, I don't quite understand the goal of the math.
> It looks to me like within a district, the game is IRV
> except that voters may refuse to transfer their vote
> after a certain point.  If I am correct about that,
> then I have two doubts.  First, I think everyone will
> decline to rank beyond their favorite.  Second, I'm
> not sure how the global results are guaranteed to be
> proportional.  (I've probably misunderstood this,
> though.)
>
> Is it wise to permit independent candidates to run?
> If they receive too many votes (which is as likely as
> receiving too few), they will regret that they didn't
> start their own party to take advantage of more seats.
>  I know in Russia and Brazil a lot of parties are
> based around individuals.  In Turkey, the recently
> elected winner party had no popularity except for
> Tayyip Erdogan (Istanbul mayor?).  (But actually,
> Canada would not likely support a lot of parties,
> anyway.  The system is too parliamentary.)
>
> I still don't think STV (etc.) can improve PR.  To run
> on the party list, candidates will need to conform to
> their parties.  They will not be able to individually
> campaign, because nobody will see the need to spend
> money on such campaigns.  They will be elected or not
> elected solely based on party affiliation.  Am I
> wrong?
>
> My philosophy is that the country should be divided
> into the fewest districts possible (maybe 50), and
> within those districts we should elect the Condorcet
> winner if he is not a fluke.  Maybe another "lower
> house" could be larger and more proportional, and
> represent more interests, but I think such a house
> should be constitutionally weaker.
>
> I'm interested to hear thoughts or clarifications.
>
> Stepjak
> (incidentally my first name is actually "Kevin."
> Yahoo.fr reverses my names inexplicablement.)
>
>  --- Stephane Rouillon
> <stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca> a écrit : > Venzke, I
> >
> > It is a STV variant defined on a national instead of
> > regional basis, and
> > that uses a mix of alternative vote and residual
> > approbation to produce an
> > exactly
> > proportional result instead of vote transfers and
> > quotas. Some other aspect
> > ensures that at worst, the governement will be a
> > and feel free to comment. (English version is the
> > fourth post...)
>
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