[EM] Steph: Extremist shouldn't change outcome?
stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca
Wed Feb 19 18:15:35 PST 2003
> As for a complete mathematical and thorough definition of
> > reciprocal fairness, try this.
> > Suppose two sets, S1 the set of voters and S2 the set of candidates.
> > Suppose an electoral method that produces scores for each candidate.
> > If you can split S1 in |S2| subsets each of a cardinality equal to the score
> > obtained
> > by the corresponding candidate, you can link these two sets using a
> > bijective
> > mapping. Each voter contributes to one and only one candidate.
> > If an electoral method produces scores that verify this property,
> > it respects reciprocal fairness.
> Using methods that verify my criteria, adding a new candidate should only affect
> the two
> neighbour subsets because this new candidate would represent better the idea of
> voters in the available ranges of ranking. Using other methos like approval no.
> Because the new comer could have the exact balanced position that maximises
> the acceptance of its two neighbour groups (and even groups further with
> On the other side of the rainbow, other voters will change their mind reacting
> this new possibility. It highers the possibility of the first side finding their
> optimal agreement,
> so the second side HAS to play it safer and will conceide by accepting a more
> "median" or centrist
> candidate.Use Alex or Bart strategy with utilities, the maths confirm.
> > The point that I wanted to make yesterday was this:
> > Either you justify your criterion in terms of other standards, and
> > ultimately in terms of standard that others accept as fundmental,
> > or you just hope that people will accept your criterion itself as
> > a fundamental standard. The latter isn't at all likely, and so I repeat:
> > Can you or can you not justify your criterion in terms of something
> > that others accept as fundamental?
> > By the way: Of course for a public proposal, a criterion that can only
> > be written in mathematical language is quite useless. For something
> > more usable, then, you'd have to write it in English (or French, Esperanto,
> > etc.). If you write it in French, I'd have to find a translator, but I'd be
> > willing to do that. Your previoius reference to your criterion didn't tell
> > nearly enough about it to be a definition.
> > But never mind
> > that. The question is whether or not you can justify your criterion
> > in terms of some standard that an appreciable number of people accept
> > as fundamental.
> > Mike Ossipoff
> The result is: methods that do not respect the "reciprocal fairness" criteria
> are extremist-candidate-dependent.
> It is understandable that when you put a new median candidate, it could become
> the winner.
> But adding a very left candidate should not affect the right candidates results.
> But if adding a new candidate C makes the winner move from A to B, I think it is
> a fundamental bias.
> "Reciprocal fairness" is mandatory. It is not sufficient to ensure a fair
> The same problem can arise from vote splitting.
> To put it in words you like. Putting a Nader candidate should not afect the
> Gore-Bush result.
> With plurality it does because of vot splitting.
> With approval it would, because anti-Nader people (We, especially you, can think
> they are wrong,
> but it does not stop them from existing and voting) would add G.W. Bush on their
> You can argue that in this specific case the polls should have shown everybody
> Nader had no chance. What if he had one? And, as fairer models will attract more
> the run will be tighter and these problem will rise more often.
> I let you answer.
Mike's answer is below...
I was busy but I pick up where we left.
B (51) > A (49)
On a unidimensional model, an extreme candidate (C) goes before B or after A
So sincere rankings can be (C>B>A and A>B>C) or (B>A>C and C>A>B).
Please tell me where C is placed with your "sincere rankings"...
It would seem that your example is not plausible at all...
In addition, let me tell you again that approval is definitively
a bad method that can elect a Condorcet Looser (if I am right,
even a strong one with 50% defeats against any other candidates even with
Bart's optimal strategy)
See my previous posts about that.
MIKE OSSIPOFF a écrit :
> Say the voting system is Condorcet with relative margins. Say
> there are initially 2 candidates, A & B. 51% prefer B to A, and
> so, as would any rank method, rm elects B.
> Now we add an extreme candidate, C. The A voters don't consider
> C to be a serious rival. They believe, rightly it turns out,
> that A will pairwise-beat C.
> Here are the sincere rankings now:
> 49: ABC
> 20: BAC
> 31: CBA
> Because, as I said, the A voters believe that A will pairwise-beat
> C, they don't feel that they need to help B. And so they aren't
> inclined to help B become BeatsAll winner. They don't rank B.
> 49: A
> 20: BAC
> 31: CBA
> Relative margins of the defeats:
> CB: (31-20)/51 = 11/51
> BA: 1/100
> AC: ((20+49)-31)/100 = 38/100
> BA has the lowest relative margin, and so A wins.
> What would have happened in Condorcet(wv)?
> The defeat's wv:
> CB: 31
> BA: 51
> AC: 69
> Condorcet(wv) has met your standard better than Condorcet(rm).
> What would happen in Approval?:
> B is middle, and the middle voters have no good reason to vote
> for other than their favorite.
> Depending on which extreme appears more likely to outpoll the other,
> the extreme voters on one side need Middle, to avoid their last
> choice. The side that expects to be outpolled by the opposite extreme
> isn't going to also expect to have a majority. They vote for Middle,
> which is B. And B wins.
> It would seem that in this plausible example, your relative margins
> is the method that lets the addition of the extreme candidate change
> the outcome.
> Mike Ossipoff
> MSN 8: advanced junk mail protection and 2 months FREE*.
> For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
> please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
More information about the Election-Methods