[EM] Dan W-J; IRV is 2nd best (=worst); CVD tells Maryland 'no research ever'

Craig Carey research at ijs.co.nz
Fri Dec 26 01:56:02 PST 2003

My last message had missing "not"s. It is fixable by using a word like
"Is" in every space that the reader might suspect a "not" to be missing.

At 2003-12-25 00:28 +0100 Thursday, Markus Schulze wrote:
>Dear Craig,
>you wrote (25 Dec 2003):
>> This can be named the Alternative Vote Twin Towers example: a support
>> rise that is nearly 50% in size and that is entirely FPTP papers, is
>> occuring while the candidate ('A') being supported changes into a
>> loser:
>> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/single-transferable-vote/message/244
>> +-----------------------------------+
>> |Winner: · ·A· · ·|Winner: · ·B· · ·|  Alternative Vote winners
>> +-----------------------------------+
>> | Tot: · 513000· ·| Tot: ·1024001· ·|
>> +-----------------------------------+
>> |· ·A· · · 1001· ·|· ·A· · 512000· ·| Change = +510999
>> | * BA · · ·999· ·|· ·BA · · 1001· ·| Change = +2
>> |· ·CBA· · 1000· ·| * CBA· · 1000· ·|
>> |· ·DBA· · 2000· ·|· ·DBA· · 2000· ·|
>> |· ·EBA· · 4000· ·|· ·EBA· · 4000· ·|
>> |· ·FBA· · 8000· ·|· ·FBA· · 8000· ·|
>> |· ·GBA· ·16000· ·|· ·GBA· ·16000· ·|
>> |· ·HBA· ·32000· ·|· ·HBA· ·32000· ·|
>> |· ·IBA· ·64000· ·|· ·IBA· ·64000· ·|
>> |· ·JBA· 128000· ·|· ·JBA· 128000· ·|
>> |· ·KBA· 256000· ·|· ·KBA· 256000· ·|
>> +-----------------------------------+
>This is neither an example showing Alternative Voting violates
>monotonicity nor an example showing Alternative Voting violates
>participation. This is an example showing Alternative Voting
>violates consistency. However, it has been demonstrated by
>HP Young that only positional methods (e.g. FPP, Borda,
>Approval Voting) satisfy consistency.

One of the authors (Ron H. in Israel) of a participation axiom paper wrote
to me. I don't need his advice: his paper is unimportant since on the
participation axiom. It seemed to me his 1988? paper was very unique in
defining that same space that even now as I write, Mr Forest Simmons is
slowly groping towards knowing.

Shulze has his usual technique of getting that maximal onto the part that
is most likely to break when subjected to weight: i.e. a few words:
"participation", "consistency". All for no good purpose. I guess that
Mr Schulze wants me to say that I don't know the definition of one of the

I protest over this technique of Mr Shulze.

 * the ideas behind the words are too poorly defined. I.e. vagueness.

 * STV experts must reject the ideas. In the case of participation it
   fails the STV meta-rule requiring rules to be powerful. It is not
   powerful in 2 ways: firstly it is only 1 winner, and it is assumed to
   be not constraining preferences other than the first. They are not

 * Mr Schulze get corrected and does not admit and worse does not
   alter his ideas.
   Even today he believes he should use personal desire alone when
   selecting a rule and never ever use algebra or mathematics in
   an attempt to see if a rule is good or unacceptable. It is a
   non-stop circus of Mr Schulze using only wrong tests. He has got
   wrong tests ensuring that he will not improperly let people see
   if he is incorrectly holding an improper purpose. If readers
   suspect that I don't know what "consistency" got defined to be
   (OK for Mr Schulze if it never was defined to an STV-grade
   quality) then my failing a wrong test is not expected to raise
   questions on why Mr Schulze did not write much more precisely.


Mr Schulze's "Participation" is rejected for meta-rule agains weakness:

  1. it was undefined for support rises on the 2nd+ candidate

  2. it seems undefined in multiwinner elections since that quite
    probably would involve my base 2 number definition of what a
    paper desired. Nevertheless I shan't suggest that such an idea
    can be made to run acceptably in a revised Participation axiom

    It is too weak if considering a single new preference and hence
    only a single candidate. That would get the rule eliminated before
    an audience the world's best preferential voting method designers.


One of the big questions is why Mr Shulze bungled his PDF document
when using the same technique: he failed to define the method and
achieved that by giving inusfficient precise meaning to the words
"stricly prefer".

As readers would readily imagine, at no moment has Mr Markus
corrected that mistake. A paper that says nothing is not one that
Mr Schulze would fix up. It is the same theory: getting the public
to admit that they don't remember what a word or two means. Unless
it was jut a blunder.


Responding further, Mr Schulze failed to define the idea of "consistency".

It should start with a capital C, I suppose.

At the moment I have no idea what Mr Schulze means by "positional".
Clearly Mr Schulze has not got a good argument.

Ms Shulze is becoming one of the worlds more boring commentators
on research into preferential voting. In the last few months it was
becoming very clear that not only is Mr Schulze unwilling to define
the Schulze method (depsite producing an academic paper on it passing
it under scavanged under utterly worthless rules or with unfollowable
arguments, or whatever), but also he writes "[other person suggested
that it] doesn't work [i.e. Floyd algorithm isn't symmetric]" and
with any trace of a line by line analysis, he wants to leak out the
belief that the Schulze method has got to be symmetric if the
Floyd algorithm is symmetric. 

He does not even have an argument. All the arguments in his published
seemed to be perfectly untroubled by the truth that he totally
bungled the definition of the Schulze method so that it was missing
from the paper.

After years here disputing with Mr Ossipoff over which was admissable:
(1) Mr Ossipoff's wording
(2) some hoax agreement purporting to comprehend Mike Ossipoff's
it is now plain that Mr Schulze was preferring "(2)". 

I complain since I assess Mr Schulze has the so called Schulze method
of the October 2003 PDF file get the alternative that is absolutely
not the alternative suggested by the fairly plain English wording.

Obviously Mr Schulze implemented the technique all throughout his
writing of trying to blot the light out and stand in the path to
(um, total error) as the single authority. I.e. clarifications and
annotations and clarifying statements of the purpose are missing.
Similarly with analyses over the wording chosen, records of
communications with others disputing the wording, etc., are missing.

Mr Shulze ha a secret agenda for using undefined terms. If he believes
that leads to wins in public mailing lists then we should be told.

Normally Mr Schulze has wrong rules that do not model societies.

Evil ideas but concealed by Mr Schulze getting his paragraph to put
its weight on a few words he didn't feel like defining (or producing
references for) and which then crash as expected under criticism.

Something was a source of unfairness and Mr Schulze would win the
argument on whether it was his carefully/carelessly designed sentences
or not.


Let me return to this text:

>This is neither an example showing Alternative Voting violates
>monotonicity nor an example showing Alternative Voting violates
>participation. This is an example showing Alternative Voting
>violates consistency. However, it has been demonstrated by
>HP Young that only positional methods (e.g. FPP, Borda,
>Approval Voting) satisfy consistency.

(1) That example can perhaps imply that the Alternative Vote fails
a monotonocity test (if theorem is added) and it does not itself show
a failure of monotonicity.

I don't see why anybody should have any interest in what "consistency"
is, and in what "positional" means. While it seems that the "H" and the
"P" of Mr Young's name ought not be placed so close together, it does
not seem that any of his ideas are interesting in the context of the

I found the example using initially mainly REDLOG to find a 4 candidate
example and then trial re paper to allow the number of candidates to
be increased.

Mr Schulze is trying to say that he read books. I am making it clear
that nothing at all that is of value might be obtained from me if
surviving here in the Election Methods List forum that is one of the
world's dumbest. Mr Schulze can't actually write at the PaP or STV
since dumb-as-a-dinosaur ponderous [lumbering, graceless, heavy,huge
labourius. Etymology: ponderosus, Latin, meaning, of great weight]
wordings and unfairness-allowing meanings if any meaning at all.

We might be right on the verge of a big improvement: e.g. I quit and
then the members renwew their religious vows to be unfair
to their fellow nat and be stumped for why that is but take solace in
the intellectual unity of being fried chips, damn, being friends.


At 2003-12-25 20:50 -0500 Thursday, Donald Davison wrote:

>Dear Diana, Donald here, there are a number of persons on this list who
>speak in gobbledegook.

If Donald Davison is ever more alert, then that might be a time when he
can get the ">" characters lined up and properly quote text.

>do not elect anyone.  This super-duper method by Craig is worst than
>Plurality-at-Large, which would need fifty percent plus one to elect both
>candidates.  I called him on this flaw in his method, but it was water off

The method behaves as if it has two votes. So it can get suspected of
holding the power of 2 FPTP papers. But there is a specific rule preventing
it from having more power than one FPTP paper (no matter how many winners).

You can correctly hint that you are correct and I am wrong. But that is
not the same as showing me wrong since I correctly say that you can't
ever convert your success in raising doubt into a concluded proof that
successfully persuades.

If you reject me wrongly then you ar violating one of your own ideas, which
says that ballot papers ought get more and more power (up to the proper
limit) as improved variants/replacements of STV keep appearing.

>Craig is not alone in this lack of understanding of election methods.  On

You can't say I did not understand why you have fully failed to show that
my 2 winner 3 candidate IFPP method is failing a power<=1 rule. Your
argument was relying on a common agreement over a wrong principle.
To reject my method, a failure under a correct rule would be neeeded.


Mr Davison on a 2 winner election

>the IRV list, someone asked if IRV could be used to elect two members to a
>city council.  Dan, who is an official of the Center for Voting and
>Democracy replied and suggested that IRV be run two times. Once to elect
>one member and a second time to elect the second member, bypassing the name
>of the first winner during the routine of the second run of IRV.
>Dan is clearly showing that he does not understand how these election
>methods work.  What he suggested is very close to Plurality-a-Large, that
>is, the same majority gets to elect both members.

It does sound quite bad.
Supposing the voters only once, they could use the analog of the
'1/3 quota unfairness to the 4th' method the 2 winner 3 candidate IFPP
being at the end. Something batter might be found.

If voters get 2 real votes then maybe the 1st could reduce the candidates
to 3 candidates, and 2nd could eliminate exactlyu one candidate.

You were running a dead pop.mich.* SMTP server for a while.


Mr Lanphier is withholding a shoot up of Condorcet (I posted while not
subscribed into a policy block to have such messages be blocked).
It explains that Mr Shulze has a greave problem with the last preference
in the idea of the weightings that papers are multiplied by when
contributing to the "prefers X over Y" subtotal, particularly in the
comparison of the 2 cases:
 (1) (...X...Y) : Y is the last preference
 (2) (...X...) : now Y shifted over the edge. 

Mr Schulze seems to aspire to hide the Condorcet destroying issue behind
only 2 words and blundered and causes his PDF article to fail to define
a Condorcet method.

The STV idealized view is that the P2 rules reigns (e.g. no winnner
changes on adding -2(A)+(AB)+(AC) if 3 candidates, etc.) and Alt.V passes
P2 already. Mr Schulze and al lthe rest of them (Mr Condorcet, etc.)
seem to be much too deep into the territory of arbitrariness and
standing against P2 is further unbreakable guarantee that they would
be rejected

Even worse is the exploding quantity of facets in the Condorcet variant
solutions. This is a new aspect to Condorcet that has not been
written on. It is like the number of facts is rising powers faster.

No one knows what the rules are. In idealized STV there are constant
rules that are totally indifferent to shifting changes in public
opinion. There appears to be no argument at all from Mr Schulze and
whatnot, on whether there is some good enough from the explosion
of rules and how everyone has not got rights while not identifying
what the average votes were.

Basic obvious errors with no defence. It is just like some fish
looking up through bits of grass and through the water saying:

  "what's the matter?: don't you believe in pairwise comparing?"

Craig Carey
Perfect voting methods: single-transerable-vote

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