[EM] Cardinal Rating Condorcet Loser Elimination

[Eric Gorr]

At 7:34 PM -0400 8/28/03, Dgamble997 at aol.com wrote:
>My favourite type of example to post on this list is the following:
>
>45 A>B>C
>6 B>A>C
>5 B>C>A
>44 C>B>A
>
>I argue that B shouldn't win because he/she is very likely to be a 
>low utility compromise- the least worst.
>
>Many people on this list disagree with me and feel that B should 
>win. They argue that he/she is a genuine compromise and the most 
>generally preferred candidate.

The entire population would rather have B then the apparently primary 
opposition.
So, B should win.

>Actually neither myself nor those who disagree with me can be 
>certain as to whether B is really a low utility turkey ( the least 
>worst) or a popular compromise ( the most best).

Finding the most preferred option is the goal.
Whether that option is the least worst or the most best does not matter.

>I've been trying to think of a method that overcomes this problem 
>and I've come up with something that I've snappily called " cardinal 
>rating Condorcet loser elimination".

Why would a voter not maximize their voting power by either giving 
someone the highest cardinal ranking or giving them the lowest 
cardinal ranking?

The answer:

The voter will always attempt to maximize their voting power within a method.

The fundamental difference between this method and strategic 
insincere voting (what James Green-Armytage recently brought up) is 
that this method requires no information on what other voters will be 
doing to maximize voting power.

As such, the method would appear to become Condorcet + Approval and 
there does not seem to be any compelling reason to add the extra 
complication.


-- 
== Eric Gorr ========= http://www.ericgorr.net ========= ICQ:9293199 ===
"Therefore the considerations of the intelligent always include both
benefit and harm." - Sun Tzu
== Insults, like violence, are the last refuge of the incompetent... ===