[EM] The Coming California Single Seat Election

[Markus Schulze]

Dear Paul,

I wrote (16 Aug 2003):
> In so far as Ranked Pairs meets monotonicity, reversal symmetry,
> independence from clones, and majority for solid coalitions in
> the general case, it meets, of course, these criteria also in
> the 135-candidate case. There is no reason why Ranked Pairs
> should fail in the 135-candidate case.

You wrote (16 Aug 2003):
> Of course it doesn't "fail", if you begin with the assumption
> that it doesn't "fail" in the 5-candidate case. But I have
> seen examples where I would consider the ranked-pairs winner a
> "failure" in the 5-candidate case (but not, of course, according
> to the criteria deemed more important to ranked-pairs advocates).
> "Failure" or "success" depends upon a ranking of the relative
> importance of crtiteria by the person making that binary decision.

What I wanted to say is:

The reasons why those who promote Ranked Pairs promote Ranked Pairs
are also valid in the 135-candidate case. The worst thing that
could happen when Ranked Pairs is being used is when a set of
additional voters who strictly prefer candidate A to every other
candidate and who strictly prefer every other candidate to
candidate B change the winner from candidate A to candidate B.
But this can already happen in the 5-candidate case. No additional
phenomena occur when the number of candidates is further increased.

Markus Schulze