[EM] Issues, Condorcet, and IRV (was: IRV vs. plurality)

Markus Schulze markus.schulze at alumni.tu-berlin.de
Wed Aug 13 08:44:07 PDT 2003


Dear Dave,

you wrote (13 Aug 2003):
> The other side of that coin is setting the cutoff too high, above
> a mediocre candidate, thus causing the mediocre candidate to lose
> to someone this voter considers to be a true reject.

When Approval Voting is being used, then it is not possible that
an additional voter changes the winner from a candidate this voter
approves to a candidate this voter doesn't approve. Therefore,
independently of whether the cutoff is too low or too high
this voter never makes the result worse from his point of view.

Markus Schulze



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