[EM] Issues, Condorcet, and IRV (was: IRV vs. plurality)
Markus Schulze
markus.schulze at alumni.tu-berlin.de
Tue Aug 12 06:15:01 PDT 2003
Dear Eric,
I wrote (11 Aug 2003):
> Here is a concrete example where Tideman's ranked pairs method
> violates the Participation criterion in a very drastic manner.
You wrote (12 Aug 2003):
> But, why should it surprise anyone that discovered votes could
> change the winner? It seems to me that in every election system
> this would be true.
But when you don't see any problems with that example showing that
Tideman's ranked pairs method violates the Participation criterion
in a very drastic manner, then why do you see problems with that
example showing that my beat path method violates the Participation
criterion in a very drastic manner?:
> Of course, but this example clearly shows the flaw in the
> Beatpath Winner method. However, in a better RP method, the flaw
> disappears.
>
> (...)
>
> It is an odd case under Beatpath because clearly finding those
> three extra votes obviously should not cause D to win, which
> they do.
Markus Schulze
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