[EM] Re: Issues, Condorcet, and IRV (was: IRV vs. plurality)
Markus Schulze
markus.schulze at alumni.tu-berlin.de
Fri Aug 8 15:34:18 PDT 2003
Dear Dave,
I guess you mean this example:
> Here is a concrete example where the beat path method
> (aka Schulze method, aka SSD, aka CSSD) violates the
> Participation criterion in a very drastic manner.
>
> Situation 1:
>
> 04 ABCDEF
> 02 ABFDEC
> 04 AEBFCD
> 02 AEFBCD
> 02 BFACDE
> 02 CDBEFA
> 04 CDBFEA
> 12 DECABF
> 08 ECDBFA
> 10 FABCDE
> 06 FABDEC
> 04 FEDBCA
>
> A:B=40:20
> A:C=30:30
> A:D=30:30
> A:E=30:30
> A:F=24:36
> B:C=34:26
> B:D=30:30
> B:E=30:30
> B:F=38:22
> C:D=36:24
> C:E=22:38
> C:F=30:30
> D:E=42:18
> D:F=30:30
> E:F=32:28
>
> The winner is candidate A.
>
> Situation 2:
>
> 3 AEFCBD voters are added.
>
> A:B=43:20
> A:C=33:30
> A:D=33:30
> A:E=33:30
> A:F=27:36
> B:C=34:29
> B:D=33:30
> B:E=30:33
> B:F=38:25
> C:D=39:24
> C:E=22:41
> C:F=30:33
> D:E=42:21
> D:F=30:33
> E:F=35:28
>
> Now, the winner is candidate D.
> Thus the 3 AEFCBD voters change the
> winner from candidate A to candidate D.
Markus Schulze
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