[EM] Re: Issues, Condorcet, and IRV (was: IRV vs. plurality)
    Markus Schulze 
    markus.schulze at alumni.tu-berlin.de
       
    Fri Aug  8 15:34:18 PDT 2003
    
    
  
Dear Dave,
I guess you mean this example:
> Here is a concrete example where the beat path method
> (aka Schulze method, aka SSD, aka CSSD) violates the
> Participation criterion in a very drastic manner.
>
> Situation 1:
>
>    04 ABCDEF
>    02 ABFDEC
>    04 AEBFCD
>    02 AEFBCD
>    02 BFACDE
>    02 CDBEFA
>    04 CDBFEA
>    12 DECABF
>    08 ECDBFA
>    10 FABCDE
>    06 FABDEC
>    04 FEDBCA
>
>    A:B=40:20
>    A:C=30:30
>    A:D=30:30
>    A:E=30:30
>    A:F=24:36
>    B:C=34:26
>    B:D=30:30
>    B:E=30:30
>    B:F=38:22
>    C:D=36:24
>    C:E=22:38
>    C:F=30:30
>    D:E=42:18
>    D:F=30:30
>    E:F=32:28
>
>    The winner is candidate A.
>
> Situation 2:
>
>    3 AEFCBD voters are added.
>
>    A:B=43:20
>    A:C=33:30
>    A:D=33:30
>    A:E=33:30
>    A:F=27:36
>    B:C=34:29
>    B:D=33:30
>    B:E=30:33
>    B:F=38:25
>    C:D=39:24
>    C:E=22:41
>    C:F=30:33
>    D:E=42:21
>    D:F=30:33
>    E:F=35:28
>
>    Now, the winner is candidate D.
>    Thus the 3 AEFCBD voters change the
>    winner from candidate A to candidate D.
Markus Schulze
    
    
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