[EM] The only strategy an Approval voter needs to know:

Stephane Rouillon stephane.rouillon at sympatico.ca
Thu Aug 7 18:03:12 PDT 2003


CR is the last method I included in my rankings.
Maybe I do not know everything about it.
However the fact that voters can put different scores
to represent the ranking of their candidates introduces an additional
strategy issue that at least Borda or approval avoid.
Is their anything to gain in exchange?
Approval and Borda seemed to handle clones better than CR that
splits a voter weight in my eye.
Did I miss something, my overview led me to believe CR had
a negative crowding effect that would encourage parties to
help clones of their adversaries?

Please, Alex explain why I should consider multiplication of
candidates consequences less important than voters latitude?
IMHO, an election cannot reach is goal if runners are affected
at start by the electoral system. Approval at least preserves that
first step.

Over to you,
Stephane

Alex Small a écrit :

> Stephane Rouillon said:
> > My preferences for single-winner methods:
> > FPTP < CR < Borda < Approval < IRV < Condorcet
> > I can justify any "<" on demand.
>
> CR<Borda<Approval?
>
> CR and Approval are normally held to be strategically equivalent, almost
> clones.  However, since CR gives more latitude to those voters who wish
> it, I would say Borda < Approval < CR.
>
> ----
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