[EM] Condorcet 2 - The Sequel ( the same people say the same things)

[Forest Simmons]

It is also important to bear in mind that Center is a relative term.  On a
scale of zero to 100, (on some objectively measureable issue) it may well
be that the voter median is at 10, way to the left of the objective
center.  The voter median is the "center" that condorcet goes for, whether
it is at the left, the right, or the middle of the spectrum of
possibilities in the one dimensional case.

And as the voter median (i.e. "center") moves around over time, so does
the condorcet winner. So saying the "center has a monopoly" is misleading
if it is supposed to mean that condorcet is not responsive to shifts in
public opinion.

Forest

On Thu, 7 Aug 2003, Alex Small wrote:

> Adam Tarr said:
> > So essentially, you are saying that defeating the weak centrist is such
> > a  high priority for you that you are willing to take down the strong
> > centrist  as well.  This begs the question, why the bias against
> > compromise  parties?  I don't see how the defeat of this strong centrist
> > is any worse  than the victory of your weak centrist.  And the latter
> > scenario has the  advantage of the Condorcet argument - that is, that
> > the winner would win  any two-candidate race.
>
> At various points it has been brought up that Condorcet's virtual
> guarantee of centrist victory (when issues are arranged on a 1D axis) is a
> guarantee of monopoly.  I later observed that IRV would allow left and
> right to compete in a 1D world, but would almost guarantee the defeat of
> the center.  I do share some people's skepticism of centrist monopoly.
> It's one thing to elect the person who finds common ground between
> different points of view.  It's another thing to guarantee a single party
> a chokehold on power.  So I'm actually more sympathetic to IRV now, as
> long as the world remains 1D.
>
> However, as Adam points out, the goal should not be to defeat the centrist
> because he's the centrist.  The only concern should be that the centrist
> not turn into the PRI of Mexico (a 70-year grip on power) or the
> Democratic Party in the South (100 years of monopoly).  Both of those
> scenarios occurred without the help of Condorcet, relying more on
> political culture than on technical aspects of election methods.
>
> As long as an election method allows for meaningful competition, the
> election method is doing everything it can to avoid the awful spectre of
> monopoly.  Condorcet DOES allow a way out of the monopoly, provided that
> people are willing to mix-and-match issues, to go 2D.  In other words, the
> monopoly can be broken by innovation.
>
> If the political culture does not allow for that innovation, then a
> tug-of-war along a 1D spectrum may really only be the illusion of
> competition.  As Forest has pointed out, the issues that get debated so
> heatedly in our elections may only be diversions from bigger issues,
> issues where the so-called left and so-called right are actually in silent
> agreement.
>
> So, although I do sympathize with the concern expressed by IRV supporters,
> I think the best solution is to allow competition and innovation.  In IRV,
> only the excluded middle has an incentive to go 2D.  And since doing new
> things is hard, it's tempting to just find refuge in the left or right and
> never break out of the mold.  In Condorcet, two very different excluded
> factions (left and right) have an incentive to innovate and go 2D.  In
> fact, the presence of a monopoly may signal the emergence of a second
> axis:  Fresh vs. stale in addition to left vs. right.
>
>
> Alex
>
>
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