[EM] IRV vs. plurality

[Kevin Venzke]

James,

 --- James Green-Armytage <jarmyta at antioch-college.edu> a écrit : 
> Dear Eric, and other voting methods fans,
> >
> You write:
> >
> >By every measure I consider important, I see no difference between 
> >the two
>  [plurality and IRV]
> >. They should both be absolutely avoided.

This is how I feel, incidentally.  I'm afraid the IRV/Plurality question is a
little boring for me.

> 	However, I am admittedly not totally convinced that Approval is superior
> to IRV. (It may well be, but nobody has convinced me of it yet.)
> 	Also, I think that a version of IRV that allows for equal rankings would
> be better than plain IRV, and would incorporate many of the virtues of
> Approval, with the added freedom of voters to differentiate between levels
> of support. Aside from monotonicity, I would like to know what other
> advantages Approval has over 'equal rankings' IRV. 

I do believe strategy would be more difficult in the latter.  A clueless voter
(such as one who who prefers to strictly rank) might be significantly disadvantaged.

What do you think about MCA?  The odds of electing a majority favorite are 
increased.

> 	I will say that I find it rather hard to imagine a normative argument
> that Approval is superior to ranked pairs or beatpath Condorcet.

There is a possibility that low-utility CW's wouldn't win in Approval.  I'm not
sure if that is "normative."  (Perhaps someone knows of more reasons.)

I do appreciate your ideas.

Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr


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