[EM] Analysis vs Proselytizing

Kislanko at aol.com Kislanko at aol.com
Fri Aug 22 18:46:05 PDT 2003


Let's agree that when we say an Election Method selects the "correct" winner, 
what we mean by that is that is the winner is consistent with the majority's 
opinion.

When there are only two candidates, this is unambiguous. 

With three or more candidates it is possible that there are different 
"majorities", so there are different "election methods" that select one of the 
majorities to determine the winner.

We are all familiar with candidateXcandidate matrix that sums voter's 
"pairwise" prrefences, but I would suggest that such a matrix is not very useful for 
determining which of the "majorities" in the pairwise comparisons is the ONE 
that that is most reflective of the majority of the voters' preferences.

Let's forget a moment the pairwise comparisons and instead of looking at 
things as
>31:  B>A>E>C>D
>23:  C>B>A>E>D
>25:  D>A>C>E>B
>11:  D>C>B>A>E
>10:  E>A>C>B>D
we examine the ordinal rankings of each candidate  by each of the sets of 
ballots:
V   A B C D E
31: 2 1 4 5 3
23: 3 2 1 5 4
25: 2 5 3 1 4
11: 4 3 2 1 5
10: 2 4 3 5 1

Now define the Score for a candidate as SUM ( function_of_ordinal_by_voter( 
candidate ) ). 

We can describe Plurality by defining function_of_ordinal_by_voter as 
F(candidate) = 1 for candidates ranked 1 by the voter and F(candidate)=0 for all 
others. B wins with 31 to 25 to 23 to 11 to 10.

Borda is sum over voters with F(candidate) = (number of 
candidates)-(ordinal_by_voter). A gets: 255, B gets 225, C gets 226, D gets 144, and E 150. By 
Borda, the plurality winner comes in third and the winner is A even though A got 
no first place votes.

My point is that in discussing the merits of Election Methods, translating 
the examples into an anlytical form makes it easier to compare results from 
different methods.

It is slightly harder to deal with iterative methods, but it appears to me on 
the face of it that iterative methods need to be preference-preserving: i.e. 
if I ranked X and Y on my ballot, when the higher of them is eliminated by an 
iterative method, the other should get the same weight in the method's 
vote-counting process as the one that was eliminated. (I.e. when I said X>Y>Z I want 
my Y>Z to count as much as my X>Y did.)

Regards,

Paul Kislanko 
-------------- next part --------------
An HTML attachment was scrubbed...
URL: <http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/attachments/20030822/ffc2be25/attachment-0002.htm>


More information about the Election-Methods mailing list