[EM] Condorcet 2 - The Sequel ( the same people say the same things)

Dgamble997 at aol.com Dgamble997 at aol.com
Fri Aug 8 06:48:02 PDT 2003


Alex Small wrote in part :

"At various points it has been brought up that Condorcet's virtual
guarantee of centrist victory (when issues are arranged on a 1D axis) is a
guarantee of monopoly. I later observed that IRV would allow left and
right to compete in a 1D world, but would almost guarantee the defeat of
the center. I do share some people's skepticism of centrist monopoly. 
It's one thing to elect the person who finds common ground between
different points of view. It's another thing to guarantee a single party
a chokehold on power. So I'm actually more sympathetic to IRV now, as
long as the world remains 1D."

This is my principle objection to Condorcet. A party that positions itself in 
the centre is extremely hard to defeat under Condorcet ( in my analysis).

In Adam's example the Centrist does enjoy substantial support, this is true. 
I am willing to accept his/her defeat as one of the unfortunate things that 
can happen in any close election. No system is perfect and different systems 
produce different unfortunate results in close situations.

To repeat ( again ) I honestly and sincerely believe as far as single seats 
are concerned that:

"IRV succeeds, I believe, in striking a balance between the two somewhat 
conflicting aims of ensuring that a candidate has majority support ( a candidate 
does not win with a minority of the vote because the opposition is split) and 
preventing dominance by candidates/parties who position themselves in the 
centre."

James Green-Amytage's original post ( I believe ) had the underlying message 
that all systems that could be considered some sort of improvement on 
plurality should be supported. Condorcet and Approval are untested as electoral 
methods in party competition elections. To prove or disprove my centrist dominance 
analysis real life testing is necessary of both of them. Therefore in say a 
local referendum to introduce them they should be supported. I may be proved 
right or I may be proved wrong.

One point I would disagree with Alex on is that IRV would guarantee defeat of 
the centre or keep it weak. In the 1950's Britain was virtually a two party 
(Labour/ Conservative) system. The Liberal party held 6 seats out of 600+ 
throughout this period. From the 1960's onwards the Liberal party began a long and 
slow recovery ( in the 2001 election its successor the Liberal Democrats 
gained 52 seats ) and also new parties such as the Scottish National party and 
Plaid Cymru grew in strength and gained representation. All this happened under 
plurality. IRV would definitely have been more favourable than plurality towards 
the Liberals and may have been more favourable towards the Welsh and Scottish 
Nationalists.


David Gamble


    
    




    
    

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