[EM] Multiple Winners, Multiple Offices, and Proportional Approval Voting

Adam Tarr atarr at purdue.edu
Wed Apr 30 19:53:01 PDT 2003

>I was pondering the best way to handle this.  I have 2 opposing desires:
>1)  Normally we like to see single-winner offices filled by a majoritarian
>method, or at least a method that usually requires more support than the
>34% required under many PR systems when there are 2 seats to fill.

>2)  We don't want a system that makes it easy for a single large faction
>to elect both the executive and the opposition leader, unless perhaps that
>faction constitues 2/3 or more of the voters.  Such a situation would
>defeat the whole purpose of having both an executive and an opposition

One method that satisfies both of these desires is sequential PAV.  That's 
where the first winner is the approval winner, then you discount by half 
any ballots that had the winner on it, and then elect another candidate 
based on the remaining votes.

This message from the archive gives a sense of what I mean.


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