[EM] Multiple Winners, Multiple Offices, and Proportional Approval Voting

Kevin Venzke stepjak at yahoo.fr
Wed Apr 30 19:18:02 PDT 2003

 --- Alex Small <asmall at physics.ucsb.edu> a écrit : 
> Imagine an election which selects 2 winners, but one of the winners will
> have more power than the other.  The candidate who performs best according
> to our election method becomes chief executive.  The runner-up goes to the
> legislature to act as the leader of the "Faithful Opposition".  You might
> envision this as a unique type of "check and balance" on the power of the
> executive.  Originally, the US Constitution did something like this:  The
> VP was whoever came in #2 in the electoral vote, rather than the
> running-mate of #1.

> I'm not sure about how to modify Condorcet or other methods.  Any thoughts?

For exactly two winners, with one specifically being the "opposition," how
about if you elect the "first" winner per a Condorcet method, and elect as the
"opposition" winner that candidate against whom the "first" candidate fared
the poorest?  That is, that candidate who received the most votes going
head-to-head with the CW.

I think that makes intuitive sense, but I'd have concerns about the scenario
where the first winner is a centrist candidate with broad support, while the
"opposition" winner is off-center with only around 25% support, let's say.
In that case, and perhaps in most cases, I'd prefer that the "opposition" be
the candidate who would've won had the winner not run.  Perhaps the method
could require that route if the primary winner beats all by a landslide.

Kevin Venzke
stepjak at yahoo.fr

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