[EM] IRV in action

Markus Schulze markus.schulze at alumni.tu-berlin.de
Sun Apr 6 10:22:01 PDT 2003

Dear James,

you wrote (1 April 2003):
> IRV does ensure that the winner has the support of half or more of
> those who are voting at the point when the final decision is made.

Usually, this property is called "Condorcet Loser Criterion."


You wrote (4 April 2003):
> I am very sympathetic to Condorcet, but there must be serious questions
> about the public acceptability of some of the results it is likely produce.

When the voters have understood Condorcet then they will also accept
situations where the winner has only very few first preferences.
Similarily, when IRV is being used then the voters will also accept
situations where an extremist is elected because all moderate
candidates have been eliminated at earlier stages.


You wrote (5 April 2003):
> Once the major parties saw the effect of the Condorcet system, their
> supporters would "bullet vote" only for the parties' candidates.

I guess that for every reasonable method there are situations where
"bullet voting" is a useful strategy. I guess that when IRV is being
used and there are three potential winners, then each party will
ask their supporters to bullet vote.

Markus Schulze

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