[EM] Strong FBC Can Be Satisfied By Ranked Methods! (sort of)

[Alex Small]

Forest Simmons said:
> Alex, it seems to me that if only the first two ranks get points, then
> in a close race among several candidates if your favorite isn't among
> the top three contenders with near equal chances, you may want to give
> the top to slots on your ballot to your preferred among the top three
> contenders.


This is true in the case of imperfect information.  I should make the
criterion a matter of hindsight:

A method gives incentives for favorite betrayal if there exist situations
in which a voter prefers an outcome obtained by ranking another candidate
over his favorite over any and all outcomes that would have been obtained
by sincerely ranking his favorite in first place.


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