[EM] Reply to Tom Mull, re: IRV

Alex Small asmall at physics.ucsb.edu
Fri Oct 25 17:36:05 PDT 2002

> On this list we've discussed Nash equlibrium with various voting
> systems...
> When talking about elections, we consider as a player a set of voters
> who share the same preferences and vote in the same way.
> Some have objected that people don't vote in blocs...

I want to add one other justification for assuming bloc-voting when
discussing Nash equilibria:

If we assume that the players are individual voters, then almost ANY
situation will be a Nash equilibrium, unless another candidate was just
one vote away from victory.  Even the 2000 Presidential election would
be considered stable if the players were single voters, because Bush led
by a few hundred votes in Florida and 2 or 3 votes in the Electoral
College (2 away from a 269-269 tie, 3 away from losing).

(Of course, I would maintain that Bush's victory was a 5-4 decision, but
that's another story....)


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