[EM] Steph: wv vs relative margins

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

Steph--

You said:

>From a representaion point of view, yes I think favouring Middle candidates 
as
you call them is not good.

I reply:

A voter median candidate is a CW. If you think it is bad to elect
voter median candidates, then you think it's bad to honor majority
wishes.

In my example with Favorite, Middle, & Worst, I didn't say that Middle
is necessarily CW, but clearly if a method is going to fail, it's
safer to fail by electing an inbetween candidate than an extreme, for
the simple reason that when we fail by electing an extreme, there
can be much more damage before the next election--if indeed there
even is a next election.


You continued:

Not because I am an extremist. First I think extreme
and middle candidates definition are relative to further sincere 
preferences. So
a condorcet ranking (typically Ranked Pairs (use the criteria you want)) is 
the
best tool to identify who is middle and who is extreme.

I reply:

Of course, the wv Condorcet methods tend to immediately go to the
voter median in their 1st election, while Approval could require 2
elections, if polls &/or popular judgements are far enough off before
the 1st election.

You continued:

Sometime middle is good,
other times extreme is good.

True, sometimes an extreme candidate, meaning one that isn't
inbetween, is the best candidate. In fact I'd venture to say that
the candidates who now are called "middle" are never the best, and
are little different from the worst. But better voting systems are
likely to reveal that the voter median isn't where the tv says the
"middle" is. Anyway, however disgusting our inbetween candidates are,
there are ones who are less inbetween who are at least somewhat worse.

But extreme candidates are like that girl with the curl right in the
middle of her forhead: When they're good they're very very good, but
when they're bad, they're horrid.

You continuted:

I am affraid, that with approval, all parties would adapt their ideas to 
enlarge
them
so to reach the consensual median ideology

I reply:

With Condorcet or Approval, a voter median candidate is a likely
winner, and yes, dishonest candidates will try to pose as median
candidates. In fact there's some tendency like that now, though no
one knows where the real voter median is.

So median-seeking hardly distinguishes Approval from Condorcet.
My advice: If someone espouses positions that you like, or that you
consider voter-median, consider the possibility that the candidate is
dishonest, ok?

You continued:

, typically the actual statu quo.

I reply:

Yes, with a better voting system, such as Approval, Y/N, or other
CR versions, or Condorcet(wv), the voter median will soon become
the status-quo. Now we don't even know where the voter median is.

You continued:

So
the feedback effect of approval would be that parties, in order to get 
elected,
would all defend the actual system.

I reply:

Dishonest parties or candidates would, with a good voting system,
try to impersonate median candidates. It will be your job to tell
which ones are lying. But don't worry; the liars will be, and are,
pretty obvious.

Now, parties and candidates defend the actual system because that's
what their contributors pay them to do, and no doubt that would continue 
with better voting systems, though with less success.

You continued:

I do think the actual system is mainly good,
we would have needed to change it if it was not fitting previous needs. But 
new
ideas and new discoveries occur, sometimes changing the world (TV is a great
example). Sometimes,
we need some change and the sooner the experience the sooner we now it is 
good
or bad. Society is like a child to me, it needs to try in order to learn,
sometimes from mistakes. If you never change, you never try, and you can 
learn
to late.

I reply:

Excuse me, but I never said that society should never change from
how it is now. You know that I vote for Nader, who advocates many
changes. But saying that you want change shouldn't mean that you
want to violate majority rule by electing an extreme instead of the
median candidate. If you elect extremes willy-nilly, as IRV will,
you might get an extreme that you don't like, and then it might be
too late.

You continued:

Sorry for the philosophical course. In other words, the method should 
consider
middle and extreme both potentially good.

I reply:

When you elect someone away from the voter-median, you violate majority
rule. Voting systems, like IRV, that jump to extremes are dangerous.

To be continued--
Mike Ossipoff



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