[EM] Forest's 3-bit approval method

[Elisabeth Varin/Stephane Rouillon]

And if you let the voter choose how many different
steps he wants you obtain a preferential ballot.

If you really want all alternatives you should use a universal ballot.
What is this universal ballot?

...

This came when I could not admit Mr. Ossipoff
reasoning about winning votes being superior to margins.
The case is:
510: A > B
490: B > A
compared to
200: B > C
0: C > B
800: B = C
Winning votes would lock A>B before B>C.
Margins would do the contrary.
When I look at this my human analysis says that
margins is the good way to order the locking procedure.

But what if
510: A > B
490: B > A
compared to
19: B > C
0: C > B
981: B = C
Would B>C be a more probabilistic ranking than A>B ?
Margins locks A>B first. The question is what means the gesture
of the 981 people would did not rank B and C. Did they simply truncate
B and C because they were not interested by them and had not the time
to look at this? Or did they have an opinon, which would be B and C are
clones, put anyone it is the same, I have no preference?
So I think we need to differentiate these 2 cases:
A ? B when I have no opinion and you can rely on other voters choice.
A = B when my opinion is that both are equally good or bad.
So if  981: B = C for real, then  A > B should get locked first.
But if 981: B ? C, then B > C is more probable than A > B.

You can check, when there is no "?" nor "=", winning votes,
margins and relative margins produce the same result.
Adding the equal (=) and undefinite (?) option for voters,
relative margins leads to the most probabilistic locking
procedure.

Finally, another element comes from approval and is
present with Demorep1's representation. Voters want
to manifest who they approve and who they disapprove.
This cannot be represented using only ">", "=" and "?" .
Disapproving some candidates is equivalent to
admit a standard replacement (because we need to have one
representative) instead. Each voter can assess his own
criteria for an average replacement politician.
We will call him Z. We can now
represent any ballot. Note we have gained some flexibility
in ordering approved and disliked candidates.

A FPTP ballot in favour of A:
A > Z > B ? C ? D ? E

An approval ballot for ABC:
A = B = C > Z > D ? E

A prefential ballot A1 B2 C3 D4 E5:
A > B > C > D > E > Z

A truncated preferential ballot , being unable to make its mind about
its first choice:
A ? B > C > D > Z > E

We even have some freedom degrees with the use of "=" and "?" around Z.

As I said a couple of messages ago,
then it is a matter of treatment of the information.

----------
Well, this is interesting.

For the record, Social Scientist types have found that a 7 bit system is

most amenable to people's tastes.

Strong Approve
Approve
Weak Approve
Neutral
Weak Disapprove
Disapprove
Strong Disapprove

I'm not saying 7bit is better than 3bit, just that, when push comes to
shove, there is an argument for it.

I suppose one should add a "No opinion" also.

8-bit, well, as a programmer, I like the sound of that :)



-----Original Message-----
From: Alex Small [mailto:asmall at physics.ucsb.edu]
Sent: Saturday, April 27, 2002 8:45 PM
To: election-methods-list at eskimo.com
Subject: [EM] Forest's 3-bit approval method


I like it!!!!!!!!

It would give greater security to voters afraid to "dilute" their vote
for
favorite, which many novices think is an advantage of IRVIt is more
conducive to majoritarian principles, which IRV promoters often talk
about.  Also, because voters would have less fear of "diluting" their
vote
for favorite it would encourage cross-over voting, which once again
helps
centrists.

I might actually like this better than Condorcet, due to its relative
simplicity.  As Joe pointed out, if Condorcet were adopted there would
still be an argument over the completion method, and although most
people
on this list are convinced that one or another method is ideal, most of
our
evaluations get technical.  I don't know how well that would go over in
a
policy debate.

I would suggest a minor modification, however:

Let people indicate more than one preferred choice, so that in the
presence
of (perceived) clones voters could put both clones number 1.  Simply put

three ratings on the ballot:  Preferred, Approved, Disapproved.  If more

than one person is rated "Preferred" by a majority the one with the
most "preferred" votes wins.  If nobody is "preferred" by a majority
then
do just as Forest suggested:  Whoever has the fewest "disapproved" votes

(or, equivalently, the most approved plus preferred) wins.

Finally, the increase in expense/complexity should be minimal.  In my
area,
as long as the machines can read paper ballots with three circles next
to
each name there should be no need to buy new machines.

Alex

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