re:[EM] Majority Choice Approval
Forest Simmons
fsimmons at pcc.edu
Wed May 8 21:21:07 PDT 2002
Thanks for these additional insights. In other words, the 50% Approval
quota is both more likely to be obtained, and it is more likely to have
the meaning of "tolerable" when the strategic approval stingyness has a
chance to play out at the Favorite level.
On Wed, 8 May 2002, [iso-8859-1] Alex Small wrote:
> Joe-
>
> I like your analysis!
>
> I want to point two one other things about allowing three levels instead of
> two:
>
> First, one problem in approval strategy is that in a close 3-way race
> (which I believe will be more common with better election methods) voters
> have a tough call when deciding whether or not to approve the compromise as
> well. It's easy enough if we simply have a tolerance threshold and vote
> for all who meet it. However, there are also strategic considerations to
> hold your cards close to the vest and protect your favorite by not voting
> for a compromise (even if you really do like him). Allowing a distinction
> will make their choice easier.
>
> Second, those strategic incentives make Demorep's suggestion of a new
> election (be it by the people or a legislature) when nobody gets a "yes"
> majority questionable. If everybody votes based on a tolerance threshold
> then Demorep's idea is sound. If, however, they vote strategically it may
> be that in fact a majority actually finds one of the candidates acceptable,
> but they held their cards close to the vest to help their favorite.
>
> Demorep's idea is much more practicable if we allow a favorite/compromise
> distinction. There are fewer incentives to hold the cards close to the
> vest, and so true yes majorities will be easier to identify. In that case
> Demorep's idea of electing "none of the above" is very practical and
> worthwhile.
>
> Please understand, I'm not defending minority rule. I'm saying that the
> majority may not identify itself for reasons of strategy, even though there
> is in fact a candidate acceptable to the majority. Given that very
> plausible situation, demanding a majority in 2-level approval may lead to
> plenty of inconclusive elections that failed to identify the majority
> preference. 3-level approval makes it much easier to identify the yes
> majority advocated by Demorep. So, I would oppose Demorep's idea in 2-
> level approval elections (as well as plurality elections) but support it
> enthusiastically in 3-level approval elections.
>
> Alex
>
> ----
> For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
> please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
>
>
----
For more information about this list (subscribe, unsubscribe, FAQ, etc),
please see http://www.eskimo.com/~robla/em
More information about the Election-Methods
mailing list