[EM] Condorcet Criterion definitions (was Markus' Econometrica reference...)

[Dave Ketchum]

Quoting Blake from below:
 >
 > But for reasonable people, the objective proof of a method passing a
 > criterion has to be supplemented by an argument for why they should
 > care.  So, the question is, if you want to make a Condorcet-based
 > argument against plurality, is this simplified by the whole sincere-CC
 > issue.  I don't believe it is. I don't feel that strongly about it,
 > though.
 >
My head swims with all the formality and "sincerity".  However, as a voter 
I often have two desires:
      Of the two major candidates I expect one to win, and I have some 
desire to make sure the "better" one wins.
      There are one or more other candidates that I LIKE, and want to help 
show their popularity, even though I expect them to lose.

In plurality I have a dilemma - I cannot back both desires, so I must 
settle for whichever I consider to be most important.

In Condorcet I can list, in order by preference, as many candidates as I 
choose (perhaps limited by ballot design):
      List my preference in major candidates, perhaps listing the other as 
less liked.
      List the candidates I especially LIKE.
      If there are candidates I abhor, list every candidate except them - 
essentially voting against them.

I choke on IRV.  In a 2-party environment the major candidates usually get 
most of the votes and the results are identical with Condorcet.  Start a 
multiparty environment with ranked ballots and I expect 3-way races 
sometimes, with IRV sometimes DISpleasing me.

I choke on approval.  I have to put in about as much effort as with 
Condorcet but cannot say as much, and have trouble deciding at what point 
above abhor a candidate deserves listing as approved.

I have limited tolerance for the complexities some theorists propose:
      I choke on anything hard to understand in public elections such as 
for governor.
      I am more tolerant in societies, including electing directors of 
a corporation - whatever MOST of the voters are willing and able to 
understand and use.

Dave Ketchum

On Wed, 30 Jan 2002 18:39:33 -0800 Blake Cretney wrote:

>  MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
>>
>> Blake continues:
>>
>> Another solution to the problem would be to redefine CC to involve the
>> idea of voting sincerely. Presumably, sincere votes in a Condorcet
>> completion method should result in the sincere Condorcet winner winning.
>> But they would not in plurality. So, if we define CC on sincere votes,
>> perhaps this would be the best solution.
>>
>> It's the one that I like best and use.
>>
>> Blake continues:
>>
>> In fact, as this list has proven, that solution is far more complicated
>> that one might naively imagine. Remember that the previously suggested
>> approaches only considered ballots, with methods and criteria based on
>> them. The sincerity-based CC involves a theory involving voters having
>> mental states that correspond to particular ballots. But it isn't
>> always clear in what sense these mental states exist
>>
>> I reply:
>>
>> What are you talking about?? You can call a preference for chocolate
>> over vanilla a "mental state", but it isn't some debatable theory.
>> It's known that people have preferences on all sorts of things, 
>> including political candidates. A definition of "prefer"? We could
>> say that John prefers X to Y if, given the choice, he'd choose X
>> instead of Y, if there were no considerations other than having X
>> or having Y. But then someone could ask what "choose" means, or
>> what "he" means, etc., but we don't have to get into that, at least
>> I "prefer" not to.
> 
> 
> Theory doesn't necessarily mean debatable.  My point was that we've 
> expanded the issue under discussion.  The old theory only considered 
> preference orders and methods based on them.  We need a new theory to 
> talk about what's going on in people's heads, and how that is reflected 
> in sincere ballots.
> 
>>
>> Blake continues:
>>
>> , and how they
>> correspond to "sincere" votes is not obvious either.
>>
>> I reply:
>>
>> That's why I defined "sincere voting", for the purpose of my
>> criteria that refer to sincere voting.
>>
>> When it's defined, it's obvious.
> 
> 
> Your definition may well be clear and easy to apply.  I don't remember 
> your definition.  My point is that it isn't obvious that it is the 
> single correct definition of sincerity, since there are multiple 
> positions on this subject (and not just mine and yours).
> 
>>
>> Yes, there can be different definitions, but not for use with
>> my criteria.
>>
>> My "sincere" should really be called "sincere & complete", but
>> I prefer the briefer "sincere". The fact that there can be many
>> different interpretations of what kind of sincerity people are
>> talking about when they say "sincere" shouldn't be surprising, and
>> it shouldn't discourage us from using the word, provided that we
>> define it in a way that's appropriate for the purpose for which
>> it's being used.
> 
> 
> It's perfectly reasonable for you define sincerity or CC your own way. 
> But then you have to explain why these definitions reveal the truth 
> about plurality.  Perhaps you have a great argument to that effect.  But 
> I think it would be simpler just to argue why plurality or approval 
> isn't acceptable to Condorcet advocates, without having to go into all 
> these new definitions.
> 
>>
>> Blake continues:
>>
>> Some people believe
>> that they "approve" only of a fixed number of candidates, and that a
>> sincere approval vote is for exactly these candidates. So for them, a
>> particular approval ballot corresponds to a particular judgment about
>> the candidates, a particular mental state. Personally, I do not
>> normally make this kind of judgment about the candidates in an election.
>>
>> I reply:
>>
>> But anyone who doesn't have any "mental state" about the relative
>> merits of the candidates shouldn't vote. You make "mental state"
>> sound like some sort of debatable ghostlike concept.
> 
> 
> Personally, I have a mental state about relative merits.  I do not have 
> a mental state that divides candidates into two different groups, one 
> acceptable, the other unacceptable.  I could perform the task of 
> dividing candidates into the two groups, but I would need more to go on. 
> For example, I could divide them on the basis of strategy.  Or, I could 
> divide them on the basis of falling at below average utility (although 
> this would be more difficult).
> 
>>
>> Isn't there, for you, such a thing as a set of candidates who
>> are absolutely unacceptable, so that voting would be a simple matter
>> of voting for everyone else, in order to do all you can to avoid
>> victory by an unacceptable?
> 
> 
> No.  There are certainly candidates I abhor.  But that doesn't mean that 
> voting comes down to keeping them out, as opposed to trying to get who I 
> want in.  As well, I may vote for one candidate I abhor to keep another 
> candidate I abhor out (in approval or plurality).  In a ranked method I 
> would usually rank abhorred candidates to the extent I have a preference 
> (unless I'm too lazy and they have no chance of winning).
> 
>> Blake continues:
>>
>> So although the purpose of the sincerity-based CC was to make it easier
>> to explain why a Condorcet advocate would reject plurality. In fact, it
>> makes the explanation much more complicated.
>>
>> I reply:
>>
>> But my definition of sincere voting, for criteria, isn't compliced.
> 
> 
> I assumed that you would want to defend your criteria and definition. 
> That makes the explanation more complicated (or at least longer). Maybe 
> there are people who are so in awe of mathematics that when you prove 
> that a particular definition (of your own design) applies, they feel 
> that you have proven your point.  If I define the "Great Method 
> Criterion" and prove that Ranked Pairs passes it, they will take it as 
> proven that Ranked Pairs is a great method.
> 
> But for reasonable people, the objective proof of a method passing a 
> criterion has to be supplemented by an argument for why they should 
> care.  So, the question is, if you want to make a Condorcet-based 
> argument against plurality, is this simplified by the whole sincere-CC 
> issue.  I don't believe it is.  I don't feel that strongly about it, though.
> 
> ---
> Blake Cretney

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   Dave Ketchum    108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY  13827-1708    607-687-5026
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