Smith Sets with >3 members

[DEMOREP1 at aol.com]

Mr. Schulze wrote-

every election method that meets the majority criterion is
vulnerable to "compromising". In so far as a voter will
usually approve at least that candidate who gets this
voter's first preference, you cannot circumvent this
incompability by using "some hybrid method that requires
information outside of the pairwise comparisons, perhaps
information not available in preference ballots".

Example:

   40 A > B > C.
   35 B > C > A.
   25 C > A > B.

   Suppose that the used election method meets the majority
   criterion.

   Suppose that A wins the elections. Then the 35 BCA
   voters can change the winner from A to C by voting CBA
   (i.e. by "compromising").

   Suppose that B wins the elections. Then the 25 CAB
   voters can change the winner from B to A by voting ACB
   (i.e. by "compromising").

   Suppose that C wins the elections. Then the 40 ABC
   voters can change the winner from C to B by voting BAC
   (i.e. by "compromising").
----
D- Are there *continuous* elections for public offices and/or voting on bills 
in legislative bodies ???

Any YES majorities in such elections ??? --- That somehow instantly become NO 
majorities ???

I note that when bills pass there is in many cases a standing rule regarding 
motions to reconsider laid on the table -- almost never taken from the table 
unless the bill has some sort of radical defect/omission.