Markus & Manipulability

[MIKE OSSIPOFF]

I'd said:

>
>Strategy that's needed to protect the win of a sincere CW, or to
>enforce majority rule--I call that "defensive" strategy. It's the
>old "lesser-of-2-evils problem", and it's the reason why most of
>us want a better voting. And still the academics & their obedient
>copiers don't seem to understand that, and still consider
>"strategy problem" to mean vulnerability to manipulation.

Markus replied (unless a reply must be related to what it replies to):

When the strategists use a strategy as a reaction to the voting
behaviour of their opponents then they never know whether their
own strategy is "offensive" or "defensive" because they never
know whether the voting behaviour of the opponents is sincere or
insincere.

I reply:

You seem to be using "defensive strategy" to mean strategy used as
a countermeasure for offensive strategy. You know, don't you, that
that isn't how I defined it. I said that offensive strategy, or the
threat of it, can create a need for defensive strategy, but I also
said that, even though offensive strategy is impossible with Plurality
& Approval, and difficult with IRV, all 3 methods have a need for
defensive strategy. Of course the difference is that Approval's
defensive strategy doesn't have the drastic insincerity of IRV &
Plurality's defensive strategy.

Markus, note that the paragraph of mine that you quoted, and which
I copied above, says what I mean by defensive strategy.

Markus continues:

Actually, for the strategy to work it is irrelevant
whether the voting behaviour of the opponents is sincere or
insincere. Therefore, it doesn't make much sense to differ
between "offensive strategies" and "defensive strategies"

I reply:

...not as you've defined them. But I defined them differently.
Check the paragraph of mine that I copied above, and which you'd
quoted before your "reply".

Markus continues:

and
to say that the first kind of strategies should be as difficult
as possible and the second kind of strategies should be as simple
as possible.

I reply:

What I've been saying all along has been that it's desirable to
reduce the need for defensive strategy, or reduce the drasticness
of the insincerity of the defensive strategy that is needed.

The mathematical strategy of IRV is many times more complicated
than that of Plurality & Approval, and I count that as a disadvantage
of IRV. Australian experience shows that voters will still attempt
defensive strategy in IRV, though it's complicated.

But making defensive strategy simple isn't my main goal with voting
system reform. It's reducing the degree of insincerity required
by defensive strategy.

Approval doesn't add any complication to Plurality's strategy, one
that voters have been familiar with for a long time.

Mike Ossipoff



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